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PREFACE
In the fourteen years -which preceded. World War I, an 
army was reborn in Great Britain* For the first time in 
recent British history an army was organized for war, a 
concept -which is basic not only In Britain today but in every 
major military po-wer in the world*
The movement for military reforms began slowly* 
Britain's bumbling, muddling victory in the South African War 
illuminated the armyfs problems* Committees and commissions 
probed the army*s ills* Two Secretaries of State valiantly 
attempted to institute reforms* However, by 1906 the British 
Army was, with minor exceptions, unchanged from the days of 
Cardwell* The years 1906 to 1909* however, were charac­
terized by dynamic changes. The army was virtually recon­
stituted; it was organized for war* An Expeditionary Force 
was created; a General Staff was established; and from the 
Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers a Territorial Force was 
fashioned*
These were the accomplishments of Viscount Richard
Burdon Haldane, Secretary of State for War from 1905 to 1912*
He was the "architect11 of the British Army which acquitted 
• ♦
itself with honor in World War I* The Haldane spirit is 
still evident today*
ii
ill
As a professional officer with a deep interest in 
military history, I was naturally drawn to this milestone 
in the history of one of the oldest and proudest armies in 
the world.* I intend to examine the influences and conditions 
which in the years 1900 to 1906 brought the pot of army reform 
to the boiling point and then portray the major reforms 
instituted by R*B* Haldane which contributed to a rebirth of 
the British Army*
It is difficult to thank all the people who have aided 
me in this effort; The Field-Marshals and Generals who gave 
of their valuable time to answer my letters, particularly 
Brigadier, Sir John 1C* Dunlop, a retired Territorial Officer 
and a renowned Military author who not only patiently answered 
my questions from his vast authoritative knowledge in this 
area, but also furnished me with rare sources from his own 
library; Miss Ella Jane Dougherty of the Omaha University 
Library whose patience and aid in locating research materials 
is also worthy of mention. I would also like to thank the 
Department of History, Western Reserve University, for granting 
me permission to use and quote from a doctoral dissertation 
on this subject* My wife, Angela, a dutiful Air Force wife, 
deserves my thanks* Finally, I owe a special debt to the 
graduate faculty of the History Department of the University 
of Omaha, particularly Dr* A* Stanley Trickett without whose 
inspiration and guidance this thesis would have remained 
merely an idea*
September 1966 Harry H* Bendorf
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CHAPTER I 
PRELUDE TO REFORM 
In the history of the British Army reforms usually 
follow war or catastrophe. As the Cardwell reforms followed 
the Crimean War, so the Boer War sparked a reform of the 
whole British defense structure. The period 1900-1905 was 
marked by several attempts at reform. The ills of the patient, 
the army, had been exposed by the Boer War and the government 
of the day, like a doctor, probed for the proper diagnosis 
through the employment of committees and commissions. The 
Secretaries of State for War attempted first one remedy and 
then another; however, few reforms were translated from 
theories into actions. This period, was not without signifi­
cance. Faltering steps along the road to reform were taken 
and the government became acutely aware that a thorough reor­
ganization of the army was necessary. This was the prelude, 
the forerunner to a series of reforms which reshaped and 
revitalized the entire British Army.
The Boer War and its Legacy
The Boer War, in the closing years of Victoria1s 
reign, was a major stimulus for army reform. When the con­
flict broke out in 1899, the entire British force in South 
Africa numbered only 22,000 men. Reinforcements were
^■John Fortescue, The Empire and, the Army (Londoni Cassell 
and. Company, Ltd., 1928), p. 305*
1
2desperately needed and all available regulars and reservists 
■were organized into a field, force and. embarked, for South
O
Africa in the winter of 1899* The needs of war served, to 
illustrate an obvious weakness; the army was undermanned.*
Most regular battalions were far below war strength, at that 
time approximately 1,100 men, and had to be augmented by 
considerable numbers of reservists* The 2nd Devonshire 
Battalion could muster only 461 regulars; more than 600 
reservists were needed to augment the 2nd Battalion of South 
Wales Borderers* The 2nd Hampshires embarked for the war zone 
250 men short, even after being complemented with all available 
reservists* This total force, the 7th Infantry Division, was 
composed, of 4,250 reservists and. 7,920 regulars when finally 
dispatched, to South A f r i c a . ^ Such a state of affairs was 
viewed, with justifiable alarm by British military leaders and. 
thinking students of the British military system remembered 
the problem after the conclusion of the War*
Not only were Britain1s regular battalions short of 
men, but they had. to be reclothed* A large number of British 
units were still dressed, in the outmoded, even if colorful, 
regimentals which were unsuited, for modern combat service*
^John K* Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 
1899-1914 (Londons Methuen, 193«)t p. 73.
3h *0. Arnold-Forster, The War Office, The Army and 
The Empire (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1900),
PP. 57-5^.
3General Sir H. Brackenbury, Director-General of Ordnance, was 
faced with the problem of equipping an entire army with suits 
of khaki drill.**
Disaster befell the British Army in December, 1899» 
Within one week*s time British forces were defeated at Stormberg, 
Magersfontein and, Colenso. MBlack Week, 11 as the period was 
known, aroused, the nation, and the humiliating sting of the 
defeat of British soldiers by untrained farmers was felt 
throughout the length and breadth of the British Empire.-^ Xt 
had at least one good effect; it served as the trumpet call 
to action on the stage of reform. The Prime Minister, speaking 
in the House of Lords on January 30, 1900, stated., MIt is 
evident that there is something in your machinery that is 
wrong. . . .  X do not think that the British Constitution as 
at present worked is a good fighting machine. • ♦ •
^Dunlop, pp. 86-87. General Brackenbury was Director- 
General of Ordnance and it was his responsibility to provide 
the troops with uniforms. Forty thousand suits of khaki were 
ordered in April, l899> but proved insufficient. Boots and 
helmets created additional supply problems.
•^William Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 191^-1918 
(2 vols.; Londonj Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1926), Vol. I, 
p. 1^. Field-Marshal Robertson, a junior staff officer at 
this time, served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
during most of World War I. Also see John Terraine, Douglas 
Haig, The Educated Soldier (London: Hutchinson and. Co., Ltd., 
1963), p. 2b.
^Robertson, Vol. I, p. lb, citing "Hansard," January 
30, 1900. The Prime Minister further indicated in his speech 
that other large nations might threaten Britain and that 
changes were needed to meet this possibility.
kIt is to the credit of the officers and men of the 
British Army that they managed to “muddle through1' to victory. 
The British fighting man conducted himself with conspicuous 
gallantry and adapted readily to a new method of warfare.
The Aldershot drill book was soon thrown away. Buttons and 
brass insignia were either dyed khaki or removed. Officers 
discarded swords, revolvers and "Sara Brownes," and adopted 
the carbine and the Boer-type slouch hat.? Lord Methuen, 
while on campaign in South Africa, described himself thusly,
"l look like a second-class conductor in a khaki coat with 
no mark of rank on it and a Boer hat and in Norwegian
g
slippers." The army learned to "travel light" as supply
lines were extended. Field.-Mar shal Lord Allenby, then a
Squadron Commander of Cavalry, wrote home:
My property now consists of the dirty clothes I live 
and sleep in day and night, a cloak, a saddle blanket, 
a tooth brush, a box of cigarettes and, a tube of lano- 
line. On the march I lived chiefly on biscuit and 
beef tongues. The horses are half starved.9
The war was won but at tremendous cost. In thirty-one 
months, 22,000 British lives were lost and the national debt 
rose L222 million.1^ The cost in men and money exceeded
?W. Baring Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War (London: 
B.T. Batsford, Ltd., 196*0, p. *f-0. "Sam Browne" refers to an 
officer's leather sword belt.
8Ibxd.
9Bri an Gardner, Allenby (London: Cassell, 196.5),
pp. 31-32. Also see Archibald Wavell, Allenby: A Study in
Greatness (New York: Oxford University Press, 19^1)* P* 85*
■^Pemberton, p. 206
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Britain*s expenditure to defeat Napoleon. The returning
army was not a resplendent force laden with trophies of war;
the scars of combat were much in evidence. Winston Churchill,
then a young officer and correspondent, described the troops
as he watched them embark for England:
First the two cavalry brigades marched past and they 
x*ere brigades no longer; the Household Cavalry Regiment 
was scarcely fifty strong; in all there were not 1,000 
sabres. Then Ridley*s l,if00 mounted infantry, the 
remnants of what on paper was a brigade of nearly 5#000;
thirty guns dragged by skinny horses. •
Xn the years to follow there were many lessons learned from the
Boer War. On 13 December 1899* Lord Esher prophesied, MThis 
war will do two things - change our whole military system in 
England and alter military tactics throughout the world.
His prophecies were fulfilled. Some of the defects immediately 
became apparento A strike force was sorely needed as demon­
strated by the haphazard, augmentation of the force initially
ill
dispatched to South Africa. There was virtually no army 
left in England; the entire regular force had been sent to 
South Africa, and no organized military reserve remained in
1:LEric W. Sheppard,, A Short History of the British 
Army (ifth ed., London: Constable and. Co., Ltd., 1950), p. 290.
■^Winston S. Churchill, Frontiers and Wars (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and. World, Inc.,1962), p. 567*
■^Maurice V* Brett (ed.), Journals and Letters of 
Reginald. Viscount Esher (if vols.; London: Ivor Nicholson and. 
Watson, Ltd.., 1934), Vol. I, p. 2if9* Lord Esher was close 
to the court. He was interested in army matters and was 
extremely influential in army reform.
l^portescue, p. 308
6Britain in the event of another conflict. This realization 
shocked many British leaders.^
Staffs were untrained and poorly utilized at every 
level of command. In 1899 there was no General Staff at the 
War Office1^ and Field Commanders complained bitterly about the 
lack of intelligence information. This is not surprising since 
only nineteen officers staffed the entire Intelligence Depart­
ment at the War Office. Accurate terrain maps were hard to 
cotae by, an understandable complaint since there were only 
twenty-eight personnel serving in the War Office Cartographic
Section..^ 7 Staff officers in the field were, in many cases,
18
officers who had no prior training in their duties, and orders 
were frequently dispatched through the use of aides instead of 
normal command channels, thereby circumventing the field staffs.^ 
Lord Roberts, testifying later before the Royal Commission, 
indicated that the staff officers of the army in South Africa 
had not been satisfactory. He blamed this on a lack of training 
and the fact that there were no definite duties established for
^Arnold-Forster, p. 46. Also see Dunlop, p. 124. 
l6Ibid., p. 71.
^*7pavid James, Lord Roberts (London: Hollis and Carter,
1954), p. 275.
18L.S. Araery, The Problem of the Army (London: Edward
Arnold, 1903), p. 272.
-^Robertson, Vol. I, p. 1?.
7the various staff functions. He pointed out that r‘. • • staff
officers cannot be improvised, nor can they learn their duties,
like the rank and, file, in a few weeks or months. . • •
The fallacy of creating field, forces and staffs at the time
of mobilization had, certainly been recognized.2-^
The government was becoming aware of the army’s
problems. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, a previous Secretary
of State for War, charged that ,f. . • the government knew the
extent of the Boer armaments, etc., they are culpable for not
having either checked them or strengthened the colonies
.,22against them. • • • Not only government and military
leaders analyzed army weaknesses, but some of the more per­
ceptive junior officers also recognized the failings and pro­
posed solutions. In 1900, Major Allenby noted H. • • the whole
2 3
organization of the array was utterly out of date. • • •" He
recommended a uniformly organized, army based, on wartime struc-
24ture and training for staff officers.
James, p. 352.
21pred,erick Maurice, Haldane, 1856-1915. Vol. I: The
Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan (2 vols.; London: Faber and
Faber, Ltd., 1937),
22J.A. Spender, The Life of the Right Honorable Sir 
Henry Campbell-Bannerman (London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd•,
n.d.), Vol. I, p* 2j?6•
2^Gardner, p. 33*
24Allenby x*as a staff college graduate, a rarity in 
1900. This may account for his forward-looking views.
8The need for a striking force and organization of an 
array for "war was paramount. The lack of a General Staff or 
staffs at the lower level had. also become a matter for concern,^ 
These were some of the problems which faced the Secretary of
State for War, St. John Brodrick.
The Brodrick Scheme
St. John Brodrick, who entered the cabinet in October
of 1900,^^ was no stranger to the War Office. He had served
as Financial Secretary to the War Office and. several years as
27Under-Secretary for War. ' To become Secretary of State for
War had been Brodrick s lifelong ambition and. he wasted
little time in proposing his preconceived plan for reform. In 
his speech on Army Estimates 28 February 1901, Mr. Brodrick 
proposed, an organization of Six Army Corps, made up of Regulars, 
Militia, and Volunteers. Three of these Army Corps were to 
serve as an Expeditionary Force ready for immediate deployment 
and three of them were to be used for home defense. These Six 
Army Corps were to be geographically distributed throughout 
Great Britain. The First Army Corps at Aldershot, .the Second
^■^Aroery, p. 11.
26R.C.K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of The 
Oxford History of England, ed.o G.Ku diark vols.; Oxfords
Clairendon Press, 1936), p® 612. Brodrick later became Viscount 
Midieton.
^Dunlop, p. 128.
2?Brett (ed.), Vol. I, p. 269.
9Corps at Salisbury Plain, the Third, in Ireland, the Fourth 
Army Corps at Colchester, and the Fifth and Sixth Army 
Corps at York and Edinburgh, respectively• The initial 
proposal provided, for seventy-nine Infantry Battalions of the 
Line at home and seventy-seven abroad* By 1903> a detailed 
composition of the six Army Corps organization was published.^
The Six Army Corps organization, a conglomerate of 
regular and auxiliary forces, was not very practical. It must 
be remembered that during the first part of Mr. Brodrick1s term 
at the War Office the British Army was still engaged in the 
Boer War; the scheme, therefore, depended on troops still 
serving in South Africa0
The Brodrick plan invited, immediate criticism. Lord 
Esher, constantly vigilant of army activities, wrote King 
Edward. VII that, considering present conditions at the War 
Office with military officials each going their own way, the 
War Minister1 s task had an air of hopelessness.^ Brodrick had. 
few supporters; Sir Henry Campbell—Bannerman wrote to a close 
friend, “You ask about Brodrick*s Army scheme. Certainly attack 
it freely. It has no friends that I know of - Military or 
C i v i l i a n . ”31 King Edward VII must also be numbered among Mr. 
Brodrick* s critics. He believed that the War Minister did not
29Bunlop, pp. 131-137.
^Brett (ed.), Vol. I, p. 401. Lord Esher maintained 
an active correspondence with the King and other members of 
the court. Esher served as King Edward* s “eyes and ears’1 on 
army matters.
^Spender, Vol. II, p. 88. Campbell-Bannerman, an 
ex-Secretary of State for War, believed that the old army 
should be left alone and. not meddled with.
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TABLE 1
THE COMPOSITION OF THE SIX AKMY CORPS*
. First Army Corps (Aldershot) and First Cavalry Brigade,
Headquarters, Aldershot
Cavalry 5 Regiments Regular
Artillery 27 Batteries Regular
Infantry 25 Battalions Regular
Second Army Corps (Southern) and Second Cavalry Brigade,
Headquarters, Tidv?orth
Cavalry 5 Regiments Regular
Artillery 27 Batteries Regular
Infantry 25 Battalions Regular
Third. Army Corps (Irish) and Third Cavalry Brigade
Cavalry 5 Regiments Regular
Artillery 27 Batteries 24 Regular 3 Militia
Infantry 25 Battalions 22 Regular 3 Militia
Fourth Army Corps (Eastern) and Household Cavalry Brigade, 
Headquarters, London
Cavalry 5 Regiments 4 Regular 1 Imperial Yeomanry
Artillery 27 Batteries 18 Regular 6 Militia 3 Volunteer
Infantry 25 Battalions 8 Regular 8 Militia 9 Volunteer
Fifth Army Corps (Northern) and Fourth Cavalry Brigade, 
Headquarters, York
Cavalry 5 Regiments 1 Regular 4 Imperial Yeomanry
Artillery 27 Batteries 18 Regular 6 Militia 3 Volunteer
Infantry 25 Battalions 4 Regular 13 Militia 8 Volunteer
Sixth Army Corps (Scottish), Headquarters, Edinburgh
Calvalry 5 Regiments Imperial Yeomanry
Artillery 26 Batteries 17 Regular 6 Militia 3 Volunteer
Infantry 25 Battalions 2 Regular 13 Militia 10 Volunteer
*John K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 
1894-1914 (London; Methuen, 193&), pp. 137-138, citing 
Command Paper l4l3» 1903*
11
give proper credence to the views of his military advisors.
The King wrote Brodrick indicating his support in matters of 
reform but also alluded to criticism which he had to make of 
the Brodrick scheme. The Sovereign, interested in the most 
minute details affecting his army, even criticized Brodrick*s 
choice of khaki uniforms for the Y e o m a n r y . 3^
Press reaction to the Six Army Corps scheme also was 
deprecatory• Blackwood*s Edinburgh Magazine attacked Mr. 
Brodrick for his lack of action and for the fact that the Six 
Army Corps scheme was nothing but a paper organization.3^
One of the most active oponents of the Brodrick plan 
was a young member of Parliament, Winston Churchill. The fact 
that Brodrick was married to the daughter of one of Churchill*s 
best friends did not deter the member from Oldham.^ Mr. 
Churchill*s criticisms of the Brodrick scheme verbalized the
3^3idney Lee, The Reign, Vol. XI: King Edward VXI,
A Biography (2 vols.j London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1927)>
Vol. II., pp. 200-208. The King argued that the Yeomanry 
would, only see limited service abroad, therefore, khaki was 
unnecessary. He settled, for colorful facings, however, when 
he found that Lord Roberts supported, khaki uniforms.
*^A perusal of The Times (London) in the years 1901 
and 1902 indicates overwhelming dissatisfaction with Mr. 
Brodrick*s proposals. This can be partially attributed to 
L.S. Amery, Military Correspondent, who opposed the scheme.
3^*»Mr. Brodrick and Army Reform,u Blackwood * s 
Edinburgh Magazine, January - June, 1902, ppI 5^3-537*
33p@ter de Mendelssohn, The Age of Churchill 
(London; Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. l89.
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feelings of many groups and elements in the government,
Churchill wielded the verbal cudgel with eloquence aid effect.
He was certainly instrumental in sounding the death knell for
Brodrick*s proposals. He first attacked the plan on the basis
of its expense; in the House of Commons on May 12, 1901,
Churchill stated, MX regard, it as a grave mistake in Imperial
policy to spend thirty millions a year on the Army.11*^
Churchill accurately sensed that the public had quickly forgotten
the defeats of the Boer War and was interested in tightening
the purse strings.^7 Further, he questioned the need for an
array of such extraordinary size and quoted the inane question
of one member of Parliament who asked:
What are we to do with our generals? When they come 
home from South Africa with no more worlds to conquer 
they must keep their hands in, and they must be 
providedwith an army, even if it does cost thirty mil­
lions a year to save them from getting out of practice.
Churchill derisively replied, nI had always been led to believe 
that generals existed, for the Army and not the Army for the 
generals,"^ The scheme was denounced in the press, in the 
House of Commons and by the military. Churchill further con­
tended that the three Army Corps Expeditionary Force should, be 
reduced to one Army Corps. He reasoned 11. • . one is quite 
enough to fight savages, and three are not enough even to
^Winston ge Churchill, Mr, Brodrick*s Army (London? 
Arthur L. Humphreys, 1903 ) 9 P»
-^Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present (London: 
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 191^ ) 9  p. 2&1.
^Churchill, Mr. Brodrick* s Army, p. 18.
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begin to fight Europeans.11^
There is no doubt that young Churchill* s views were 
somewhat parochial and that he was a firm believer in the 
‘‘Blue Water Doctrine.tf He declaimed, “The honour and secur­
ity of the British Empire do not depend, and can never depend, 
on the British Army. The Admiralty is the only Office strong 
enough to insure the British Empire. • • •
Churchill also charged that Britain was not getting 
her money*s worth. France was paying twenty-eight millions
for twenty Array Corps; Germany could buy twenty-two Army Corps
♦
at a price tag of twenty-six millions; and Russia could fund
kl
twenty-three Army Corps with thirty-two millions.
By January of 1903* Brodrick*s plan was clearly marked 
a failure, yet Churchill was not content. He continued to 
condemn Brodrick and the scheme in his speeches. He objected 
that the plan did not properly provide for the defense of 
England. It was too costly. He branded the scheme an
]| O
11 • • • ill considered conglomeration of absurdities. • • •1 
Brodrick*s proposals for enlistments also came under 
Churchill*s guns, and the young member of Parliament continued
^9Ibid., p. 22.
^ Ibid., p. 2 h.
^ Ibid o > p. 30.
^ I b i d ., pp. 60-61.
14
his attack on the unfortunate War Ministers
Two years ago he /Brodriclk/ told us that he adhered 
to a system of enlistment whereby men serve seven years 
in the Army and five with the Reserve, and last year 
he came down to the House of Commons with a new plan 
of their serving three years with the colours and nine 
with the Reserve. • • *43
Brodrick had only realized a fraction of his plan. Churchill
did not fail to grasp this fact and criticized:
The first Army Corps is not yet half formed; the 
Second Army Corps is a mere skeleton; the Third. Army 
Corps is incomplete. The Fourth Army Corps consists 
of Lord Grenfell, who is and needs to be a host in 
himself. And as for the Fifth and Sixth Army Corps, 
where are they7 I am told, that one of them is 
lying in a pigeon-hole at the War Office, and. that 
Mr. Brodrick has taken the other with him in a red . ^  
dispatch-box on his cruise in the Mediterranean. . . .
Churchill was one of many, but the most articulate of the critics.
The influential JL.S. Amery compared the Brodrick Army Corps to
one of Hans Christian Andersen*s fairy tales.^
Brodrick*s scheme was a monumental failure; however, he
must be credited with some excellent improvements in the British
Army. Under his administration an improved rifle was adopted;
heavy artillery xvas introduced,; ambulances were improved; the
expense of uniforms was reduced and. their serviceability was
increased. An experimental barrack was built which allowed.
soldiers to have a small cubicle to themselves instead of
living in a large open bay. The War Office also received some
^ Ibid. , p. 62.
^ I b i d . , p. 64. Considerable use of Churchill* s speeches 
and quotations are made here because he was one of Brodrick* s 
most consistent and articulate critics.
^Amery, p. 27*
1:5
much-needed, attention. Mobilization and. Intelligence were 
placed under a single head and a department of Education and 
Training was also created.^ The War Office career of Brodrick 
ended in the autumn of 1903* and he became Secretary for India.
Committees and Commissions
The story of army reform in those uncertain days would, 
be incomplete without a description of the multitude of 
committees and Royal Commissions which were constituted to
j
review and. investigate army problems. Between the Crimean War
and the year 1904, there are records of 567 committees and
4 7commissions dealing with the British Army.
The first commission which came to grips with the
problems of the army in the final years of Victoria*s reign
was the famous Hartington Commission. This commission was
appointed in 1888 to investigate the administration of the
army and navy and. their relationship with the treasury. Lord
Randolph Churchill and Mr. Campbell-Bannerman were two
48members of this body. The reports of this commission were 
in two sections; one was rendered in I889, the other in 
1890.^9
^James, p. 3^3
^Hampden Gordon, The War Office (London: Putnam,
1935), p p . 48-49.
^¥heeler, p. 244.
^Gordon, p. 68.
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The Hartington Commission recommended that the post of 
Commander-in Chief should be abolished and. be replaced by 
a General Officer responsible to the Secretary of State for 
War and that a General Staff be created.*-*0 Had these recom­
mendations been implemented immediately, the work of future 
commissions might have been eased considerably. However, the 
report was weakened by Campbell-Bannerman who submitted, a 
dissenting minority opinion. He took issue with the creation 
of a Chief of Staff. He considered the post unnecessary as it 
would too closely pattern the British Army after the Prussian 
staff.^1
The reactions of the Command,©r-in Chief, the Duke of 
Cambridge, and Queen Victoria were predictable; the Queen 
termed the report abominable and. the Duke warned of catas­
trophic implications.*^ The considerations were political; 
the Queen had. utilized a royal Commander-in Chief as her 
liaison with the army for forty years and at this time she 
was considering the Duke of Connaught as the logical successor
*5°Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, Vol. XXX 
(Reports of Commissioners), Cmd. 5979* 1890, “Preliminary 
Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to enquire into 
the Civil and Professional Administration of the Naval and 
Military Departments,11 pp. 1-17* cf. Amery, pp. 291-292, 
citing The Hartington>Commission Report.
■^Spender, Vol. I, pp. 117-119*
^Gordon, p. 69*
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t 53to his cousin s post*
The recommendations-of the Hartington Commission did. 
not come to pass until later years. In his memoirs, Field 
Marshal Sir William Robertson wrote, MSo long as these views 
prevailed, ^Th.e Queen*s and Campbell-BannermanxsJ it was not 
possible for the Empire to be provided with the requisite 
measure of military security, and nothing of much value was 
in fact done until some fourteen years later.*1^
The next commission of importance was the Elgin 
Commission. The bitter experience of the South African War 
fresh up>on his mind, King Edward, VII pressed for an investi­
gation in August of 1901. However, when the cabinet recom­
mended. a Royal Commission of Investigation in 1902, the King 
objected to % ’ashing one*s dirty linen in p u b l i c . T h e
cabinet, however, persevered and. the King relented. It was
56he who suggested, Lord Esher serve on the commission-' which 
was officially constituted in 1902 as the Royal Commission 
on the War in South Africa. The chairman of the commission
53j a m e S 9  pp# 222-223* This attitude was clearly re­
flected. in a letter to the King from Lord Esher who wrote, 
nTbe recommendation of the Commission was not carried out, 
because the Queen, very naturally, at the end of her Majesty*s 
long life and reign was unwilling to face the consideration 
of so great a change. 11 See Brett (ed. ), Vol. I, p. 409*
^Robertson, Vol. I, p. 9*
•^Lee, Vol. II, p. 91.
•5^ Ibid. , p. 92.
■was the Earl of Elgin; Viscount Esher and Sir George 
Taubman-Goldie -were among its most prominent members.
The purpose of this group was to investigate the preparations 
which had been made for war in South Africa, particularly in 
the area of equipment and, personnel.^ The investigation of 
the commission was thorough and complete; more than 22,000 
questions were asked and 114 witnesses examined.^
Throughout the proceedings, Lord Esher faithfully 
kept the King informed. On October 14, 1902, he directed the 
Sovereign*s attention to Kitchener*s recommendations for more
/Ta
training for both officers and men. u As witnesses were 
called and examined, Esher continued his voluminous corres­
pondence to King Edward VII. Lord Esher was particularly 
impressed by the detailed testimony of Lord Roberts who dis- 
played an excellent grasp of the entire military situation.
As the commission began to consider its report, it became 
evident that all members were not in agreement. Lord Esher 
wrote on 30 April 1903* "We had a long and difficult day 
with the Commission. It was a prolonged wrangle over the
•^Dunlop, pp. 148-149* The Royal Commission on the 
War in South Africa was also known as the “Elgin Commission.
It was also incorrectly referred to as the “Esher Commission.11
■^Dunlop, p» l66o
^Jaraes, p. 387<>
6°Brett (ed.), Vol. I, pp. 333-336.
-^*-Xbid., pp. 368-369. Lord. Roberts was at this time 
Commander-in Chief.
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Report, and there is no chance of an agreement upon the
/To
points -which I care most about.*
The Elgin Commission published, its findings in August
of 1903* The deficiencies revealed can be best summed, up in
the words of the reports
Only an extraordinary combination of fortunate circum­
stances, external and internal, saved the Empire during 
the early months of 1900 and there is no reason to 
expect a repetition of such fortune, if, as appears 
probable, the next national emergency still finds us 
discussing our preparation.^3
The report offered no particular recommendations but summar­
ized. the state of unpreparedness for war which existed in 
the Br i t i sh Army•
Lord Esher, however, submitted an important minority 
report concerning War Office organization. He recommended 
that the War Office Council be reorganized, and. their functions 
be defined.; that the War Department must be decentralized 
internally and, most important, that the post of Commander-in 
Chief be abolished and a General Officer who was responsible 
to the Secretary of State for War be appointed,. Sir George 
Taubman-Goldie added, his concurrence to the views of Viscount 
Esher.^
62Ibido, p. iK>0.
^James, p. 392, quoting Report of the Royal Commission 
on the South. African War, 1903»
filxAmery, pp. 295-301, citing Lord Esher-1 s Memorandum 
on War Office Organization. This memorandum, as well as 
SirTaubman-Goldie*s views are reproduced in Amery*s book.
Also see Dunlop, pp. 203-20L.
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In April, 1903» another commission, the Norfolk
Commission, was formed. This body concerned itself, with the
Auxiliary Forces and an exploration into the possibility of
63compulsory service. ^ The commission, chaired by the Duke 
of Norfolk, numbered among its members the Earl of Derby,
Baron Grenfell and many distinguished, militia and volunteer 
officers. One of these was K. Spenser Wilkinson,0 author 
of The Brain of an Army, a book which wielded tremendous 
influence on the later establishment of a General Staff. This 
commission was charged to determine whether the organization 
of the Auxiliary Forces tvas adequate and to recommend changes 
to insure their efficiency and strength. '
The commission made many valuable recommendations, 
particularly those pertaining to the Volunteers. It proposed 
a system for training volunteer officers and giving them 
monetary grants to attend schools to improve their efficiency. 
Recommendations to improve training in musketry and gunnery 
also were proposed. u
Even though not explicit, the Norfolk Commission 
recommended some measure of conscription to augment Militia
Zf Q
and. Volunteer forces. H.O. Arnold-Forster, Secretary of
^ Ibid. , p. 151* The Norfolk Commission was also 
referred to as the MAuxiliary Forces Commission."
66Ibid., p. 173-
^^Ibid.
^Ibid. , pp. 315-319s> citing Report of the Norfolk 
Commission. The extract from this report is contained, in 
Appendix H of Dunlop.
^ xbid., p. 17&.
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State for War at that time, indicated his irritation with the 
report of this commission when he wrote to his sister, 1 At 
the, last moment there comes on the top of me the report of 
the Auxiliary Forces Commission; and every recommendation in 
it means money.11?'0 On the other hand, Lord Roberts, Comman- 
der-in Chief and a staunch supporter of compulsory service, 
firmly supported the findings of this commission,^
In 1903? the King placed considerable pressure on
Lord Ssher to become Secretary of State for War. Esher,
however, did, not want the post and considered himself more
valuable in his present capacity. He preferred the guise
of subtle influence to the mantle of public office. Esher,
however, did consent to act as Chairman of a committee to
72reorganize the War Office, On September 27, 1903* he wrote 
Lord Knollys, the iingfs Secretary, nIf this plan is adopted 
and I am chairman of such a body, I shall propose to take the 
War Office Administration right through, from top to bottom 
and endeavor to make it a first class business machine. • • •
It was at King Edward’s urging that the committee of three was
^Mrs. H.O. Arnold.-For ster, The Right Honourable Hugh 
Oakeley Arnold-Forster, A Memoir (London; Edward Arnold, 1910), 
p. 255> hereafter cited as Memoir.
^James, pp. Ll3-^1^.
?^Brett (ed.). Vol. II, pp. lL-18. Lord Esher shunned 
public office. He had previously refused, the Under-Secretary­
ship for War as well as other important offices. He did serve 
as Secretary to H.M. Office of Works from 1895-1902.
^Ibid. , p. 23.
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appointed to consider the complete reorganization of the War 
Office In November 1903* the membership -was constituted.
It consisted of Viscount Esher as Chairman, Admiral Sir John 
Fisher, and Sir George Sydenham Clarke. Lieutenant-Colonel 
G„F. Ellison was appointed Secretary, a post which was to 
have a profound influence on his career.
The committee worked x^ith speed and dispatch and the 
first of the committee*s recommendations were submitted on 
30 December 1903® The group recommended that the Office of 
the Secretary of State for War should be placed on an equiva­
lent plane with the First Lord, of the Admiralty; the adminis­
tration of the War Office should be vested in an Army Council, 
headed, by the Secretary of State, and composed of four 
military members and, two members of Parliament. The committee 
further proposed, the abolition of the post of Commander-in 
Chief; that a General Staff be established; and, that an 
Inspector General be appointed to insure efficient and stan­
dard training for the army. The committee also proposed a 
revision of financial control.^ These recommendations were 
well received and the King wanted to decorate the committee 
in recognition of their services. However, Mr. Balfour, the 
Prime Minister, did not concur since Fishex* was elevated to 
First Sea Lord and the post of the Secretary of the Imperial
7\ e e } Vol. II, p. 19L.
^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, p. 30* Also see Gordon, p. 78. 
7^lbid., pp. 79-80* Also see Lee, Vol. II, pp. 196-197*
23
Defense Committee had gone to Clarke*^ He considered these 
rewards sufficient*
Government reaction was almost immediate. The Army 
Council was appointed on February 8, 190^*^® Press reaction 
was also favorable* The Times heralded the committee report 
as 11. • • One of the most important state documents issued
in this generation. Lord Esher was naturally pleased with
the reception of the report. He noted, {,The thing which 
gratifies me i s the enthusiasm of the young officers of the 
Army. They are more than friendly. Lord Roberts alone, among 
the older men, is full of congratulation.**?0 The office of 
the Commander-in Chief was finally abolished.* There was little 
consideration for the feelings of Lord Roberts, incumbent of 
that office, or for some of his fellow officers* In order to 
vacate the post and to mollify Lord Roberts, he was offered 
the Inspector Generalship which, after serving as Commander- 
in Chief, he was bound to refuse. Arthur Balfour wrote to 
Roberts, ’’it is, of course, impossible for me to suggest that 
on the abolition of the post of Commander-in Chief you would 
accept this new and. as now designed, distinctly inferior 
position. • • . ,t8^
^ Ibid. The King deferred to Mr. Balfour*s desires*
He made sure, however, that the government knew of his high 
regard for these three individuals.
^Dunlop, p* 208.
79The Ti mes (London), February 1, 190^*
80Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 4l-J*2.
81James, p. *K)2.
180081
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The lack of respect and the abruptness of manner with 
which high ranking officers were being dismissed at the War 
Office left much to be desired. General Henry Wilson, 
referring to the committee of three, commented, nThe trium­
virate are carrying on like madmen. . • He also noted, the
rapidity with which the changeover of the War Office took 
place.82
The Esher Committee recommendations were a positive 
beginning. Much was yet left to be donej however, the period 
of attempts, experiments and unsuccessful schemes was not yet 
past •
Mr. Arnold-Forster at the War Office
While the committees and commissions were grinding 
out their findings and recommendations, another change had 
taken place at the War Office. Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster 
had succeeded. St. John Brodrick to the War Office post. The
Prime Minister invited Arnold-Forster to become a member of
8 3the cabinet in October 1903* and Arnold-Forster was
immediately faced with a personal decision. He had just
recently suffered a slight heart attack while horseback 
8^riding and was uncertain of his physical fitness for this
82C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson; His 
Life and Diaries (2 vols.l New York: Ch a r 1 es Scribner‘s Sons,
*192TT> Vol“. II, p. 55* Also cited in James, p. 402.
8*^Arnold-Forster, Memoir, p. 22L.
^Xbid., p. 223.
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strenuous undertaking. However, the new War Minister had 
definite ideas about array reorganization and believed that 
he deserved his chance to carry them out.8-2 His was to be . 
a short career laden with frustrations and opposition which 
hounded, him at every turn. He clearly realized the obstacles 
he faced. It was only days after he accepted the seals of 
the War Office that he confided to his brother,
"Parliamentary time must be short - may even be very short - 
the Party, on whose support I must rely, is torn by
O £
conflicting views* « , •
Arnold-Forster was not a newcomer to army problems
and, was eminently qualified to undertake the task he set out
to do. His qualifications are well summed up in his own words*
• . • I have been a most careful student of all
questions connected with the services* Of the 
actual experiences of war I do not pretend to have 
any knowledge, but of soldiers I have seen some­
thing, I have been at the manoeuvres of nearly 
every army in Europe, and constantly at those of 
our own troops* I have marched with the infantry 
regiments and ridden with the artillery* I have 
seen artillery firing and experiments in gunnery 
of every kind*®?
The new Secretary of State for War had also written exten-
OO
sively about the army and army problems* Esher, whose hand
8-5Ibid., pp, 223-226.
86Ibid., p. 225*
8?Arnold,-Forster, The War Office, The Army, and The 
Empire, p. 5*
88Arnold-Forster, Memoir, p. 371«
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continued on the pulse of army affairs, warned Balfour 
". • • Do not let Arnold-Forster be in a hurry. Brodrick 
created six beautiful Army Corps on paper. Let his younger 
colleague beware."89
Arnold-Forster1s environment was not a pleasant one.
The army was bitter because it had been the. target of continued 
organizational changes and its pride had. suffered as the result 
of the post-Boer War investigations and inquiries. Arnold- 
For ster was also faced with the cry for economy. The British 
people were tiring of carrying the burden of the wartime army 
b u d g e t . T i m e  for planning was short. The new War Secretary 
was immediately faced with several considerations. The 
three-year enlistment policy had. failed and the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa also were 
still largely without action. He immediately drafted a
memorandum which was circulated among the Army Council, the
91-cabinet and the military leaders.
Basically, Arnold-Forster1s recommendations were theses 
The British Army should be made up of a Long Service Army and 
an army for home service. The Long Service Army would be 
composed of regular battalions and would be eligible for
8^Brett (ed.), Vol. IX, p. 31. 
9°Arnold-Forster, Memoir, pp. 232-233. 
Ibid., pp. 236-237.
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service throughout the Empire. The Home Army would be tasked 
with the responsibility of reinforcing the Long Service Army 
and expansion in the event of war. The terms of enlistment for 
the Home Army would be fifteen months with the colors and six 
years in the reserve, whereas the Long Service soldier would 
serve nine years on active duty and three in the reserve* 
Arnold-Forster also proposed, the reduction of several bat­
talions of regulars whereas a large portion of the Militia
would, make up the Home Service Army. The remainder of the
92 iMilitia would be disbanded.. Brodrick s Army Corps system
was effectively discontinued with the new scheme proposed by
Arnold-Forster.
High ranking militia officers who sat in the House
of Lords and, had vested interests in the Militia wasted no
93time in making their influence felt. Xn the spring of 190L, 
Arnold-Forster began to sense the spirit of opposition that 
was building against him. "Of course I know exactly what I
want to do," he wrote, "but the trouble is to persuade other
- 119l^people.
The War Secretary also encountered considerable delay
9 5in moving his memorandum through the cabinet and the Council.^ 
"Here am I," he wrote in June 190^, "in a sea of troubles, not
92Ibid., pp. 239-2^1 .
93Brett (ed.), Vol. II, p. 58.
Arnold-Forster, Memoir, pp* 251-252.
^Dunlop, p. 178.
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all of ray own making. My statement has been put off - to the 
Greek Kalends, perhaps; X know not.11^
Finally in July of 1904, the War Minister addressed 
the House of Commons and presented his complete proposal for 
the reorganization of the army and the War Office. He for­
malized his scheme for the two armies. He asked, for a reduc­
tion of Volunteers and Militia, however, he proposed to take 
60,000 Volunteers into his Home Army. With his recommenda­
tions, the old Cardwellian principle of linked, battalions was
abandoned•97
A part of the General Service Army was to be quartered 
at Aldershot and serve as a striking force. The Home Army 
was to be composed of 107 Guard and. Line Battalions whereas 
the General Service Army would be composed of 185 Guard and
Line Battalions.98
The opposition now began to form in strength. The 
press reaction was generally unfavorable; Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.W.A. Pollock, the editor of United Services Magazine, con­
demned Arnold-Forster1s scheme for not including a provision 
for conscription.99 Lord C.F. Haliburton, a previous
9^Arnold.-Forster, Memoir, p. 255*
97jbid., pp. 265-267. Also see Dunlop, pp. 180-181.
98ibid.
99a.W.A. Pollock, “Army Reorganization,11 The Fort­
nightly Review, Vol. LXXVT (July to December, 190^), 
pp. 1064-10 72.
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TABLE 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL SERVICE ARMY AND 
THE HOME SERVICE ARMY AS PROPOSED BY 
H.O. ARNOLD-FORSTER*
Number of Battalions
All
RanksFoot
Guards
Line
Battalions
10 mm mm 9,079
Home • • • • • • • — 26 General Service 21,024
- - 71 Home Service 36,920
Total for Home • • 10 97 67,023
Total for Colonies
and Egypt • • • • — 26 General Service 22,438
Total for India — 52 General Service 53,924
Total * * * * 10 175 143,385
♦John K* Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 1899- 
1914 (London* Methuen, 1933), p* 181, citing Command Paper 
1910, . August 1, 1904.
Under-Secretary for War published a pamphlet entitled Army 
Organization, in which he summed up the scheme as 
fl* • • illogical, incongruous and impracticable*1,100
The attacks began to tell on the unfortunate War Minister 
and he related to his sister in August of 1904, "Yes, I am a 
Secretary of State, no doubt, but not destined, 1 fear, to be 
a very fortunate one*11’1’01 He had little doubt that both the 
military and the public stood solidly against him*
■^^Lord Haliburton, Army Organization (London* Edward 
Stanford, 1905)* P* 44*
^^Arnold-Forster, Memoir, p. 273*
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When Parliament reconvened in 1905, the pressure
continued* In February of that year he was taken to task by
the honorable member from Oldham, Winston Churchill, on the
policy of enlistments* Churchill, who was concerned, with the
constant altering of the enlistment period., charged that in
a span of four years the enlistment period had undergone five
changes and that stability was needed.*102 In April, 1905,
Campbell-Bannerman rose in the House of Commons to belabor the
unfortunate War Minister, charging that no progress was being
made in the area of army reform and that during the last four
years one scheme had followed another*10^ Campbell-Bannerman
believed there was a distinct lack of unity in the proposed
reforms and that Arnold-Forster was not getting to the root of
the matter* This opinion was shared by many in the House of
104
Commons and the army. Arnold-For ster was beset not only
by the opposition from the army and the government; St* John 
Brodrick and Lord. Lansdowne, his two predecessors, also schemed 
against him. After all, he was condemning their administra­
tions* 10 ^
102Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, 
CXLI (1905), P« 1193, hereafter cited, as "Pari. Debs.".
103ibid*, CXLV (1905), P. 611.
10^Spender, Vol* II, pp. 149-150.
10^Elie Hal6vy, The Rule of Democracy, 1905-1914,
Vol. Vis A History of English People in the Nineteenth 
Century, trans* E* I .Watkins ("6 vol s.; New York* Barnes and 
Noble, Inc., 1961), p* 171* Their opposition was earlier 
predicted by Lord. Esher* See Brett (ed.«), Vol* II, p* 32*
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King Edward VII must also be counted among the
opposition* He did not appreciate the highhanded methods of
Arnold-Forster who either did. not keep him fully informed of
proposed reforms or did not give the monarch adequate time to
106
study the proposals he presented to him* After the l^fth
of July 190.5 speech, the King let it be known "• * * that what 
the Army, expecially the Officers throughout the Army, requires 
at the present time, is a period free from disturbance and 
constant change*
As the year 1905 came to an end, the Unionists were 
swept from office, and with them Arnold-Forster• Lord Esher 
crowed, "The change of Government has produced one great good 
at least* It has rid us of Arnold-For ster •
The unfortunate War Minister cannot be held solely 
accountable for his failures* He was tactless and overbearing 
with his generals, yet he was also dedicated, sincere and 
difficult to sway* H*0* Arnold-Forster did not believe in 
compromi se.
The demise of Arnold-Forster1s ill-fated, reforms must 
also be attributed to other factorst the failure to fill 
enlistments for the outposts of the Empire; the powerful and 
influential militia officers who protected their vested 
interests from their lofty seats in the House of Lords; and
lo6Lee, Vol. XI, pp. 196-208, passim. 
107Ibid., p. 205.
lo8Brett (ed.), Vol. XX, p. 132.
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the opposition in the House of Commons, particularly from those
who wished to economize on the army in order to benefit the
109 navy. *
The Lack of Professionalism in the Army
To place this era of attempted reforms into its proper 
perspective, it is necessary to consider one more important 
factor - the army and its lack of professionalism.
The army which fought in the Boer War was basically 
without change from the days of Cardwell. Years earlier the 
Duke of Wellington had complained that, “Nobody in the British 
Army ever reads a regulation or an order as if it were to be 
a guide for his conduct, or in any other manner than as an
1 -| A
amusing novel.*! This distinct lack of professionalism was
still prevalent among Queen Victoria1s officers. The military 
calling was once referred to as, f*A phase in the sporting equip­
ment of a gentleman. “H I  It was certainly so considered by many 
of the army officers of that day. One historian described the 
British Army as "An army of ordinary men officered by gentle­
men."^'**^ Very few of these young gentlemen were interested 
in making the army a full-time professional occupation. Some
■^^Dunlop, p. 197*
^"^Robert Blake, "Great Britain," Soldiers and Govern­
ments, ed. Michael Howard, (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1959), p. 27.
^■^Gordon, p. 77.
^•^•^Sheppard, p. i*75»
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officers of fashionable cavalry regiments spent as many as 
250 days a year on leave, hunting, or engaged in other 
sporting events.^^ Field-Marshal Wavell1£ first request 
to his Commanding Officer, when reporting to India as a young 
subaltern, was for three months1 leave to go hunting; it was 
granted*
Throughout the officer corps there seemed to be an
antipathy to theory and military education* Gambling and
bibbing wine were more pleasurable occupations* Few owned a
professional library• Training was lacking. At the War
Office the responsibility for training of troops was vested
116in two junior officers. The military education of the .
young officer at Sandhurst was also outdated* Field-Marshal
Wavell, looking back to his days at Sandhurst related:
We spent a lot of time doing sketches and in drawing 
to scale diagrams of old-fashioned redoubts, lunettes, 
etc*, which I suspect-were unchanged since Crimean 
days. On the other hand we learnt little tactics.M
The Staff College was scorned by most officers and only a
H  8few competed for the thirty-two annual vacancies*
de Watteville, The British Soldier (New York: 
G.F. Futnam1s Sons, 1955)$ P* 205*
H U  ,
John Connell, Wavell, Scholar and Soldier (New 
York: Harcourt, Bruce and. World., Inc*, 1964), p* 47•
•*--^ de Watteville, p. 18.
•^^Robertson, Vol. I, p. 14*
■^•^Connell, pp* 38-39*
® Gardner, p* 14.
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These conditions had to be changed. Fortunately, a 
new breed of officers was in evidence who were concerned with 
the lack of staff education and training. They did not share 
the majority opinion that the army was a friendly club for 
gentlemen, with facilities for polo and hunting. Lieutenant- 
Colonel William Robertson, an officer who later became a 
Field-Marshal, repeatedly bemoaned the lack of training of 
both officers and men. He was quite concerned over the lack 
of skilled staff officers and the fact that few senior 
commanders had attended the Staff College.11^
Bernard Montgomery, then a young subaltern, was 
disgusted with the senseless traditions which permeated the 
Officers* Messes of the early 1900*s. Compulsory drinking
I
particularly irked the young o f f i c e r H e  was also disturbed
by the lack of professional military thinking and the attention
paid to senseless minutiae. When given an oral examination
on mule transports, Montgomery was appalled at the questions
hH o w  many times in each 24 hours are the bowels of a mule
moved.?11 Ridiculous drill of this nature annoyed Montgomery
and many of the new breed of British officers serving their
121apprenticeship in the post-Boer War days.
•^-^Victor Bonham-Carter, Soldier True (London:
Frederick Muller, Ltd., 19^3)$ P • 47•
120sernard. Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field- 
Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K.G-. (Cleveland.s 
The Wo r1d Publishing Co., 195 $  P • 2 7•
12ljbid., pp. 28-29.
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Hie enlisted men of the army were of a different
category* They were generally of a low class, many of them
illiterate* Some were not even physically fit for strenuous
122duty and others were barely a step ahead of the jailer*
The quality of the rank and file was slowly improving,
yet their education was still meager and many of them were
given to excessive drinking and gambling* The middle class
of England considered it a disgrace to have a son in the army*
When William Robertson, later a Field-Marshal, enlisted in the
army as a private, his mother wrote him, ,fI would rather
m123
These were the prevailing conditions* Xt was due to 
the efforts of men like Robertson, Montgomery, Haig and 
Allenby that the officers of the army were to become true 
professionals, and that serving the colors became a respect­
able career* Meanwhile, however, the lack of professionalism 
in the army provided another spur to the steed of reform*
The Aftermath
The period, of attempted army reforms serves to illus­
trate the magnitude of the task which confronted Richard Haldane 
whose reforms will be fully examined in the following chapters* 
The army, weary of commissions, committees, and rapidly changing 
administrations, viewed every new reform proposal with suspicion*
Bury fsicj you than see you in a red coat
122Amery, pp* 241-2^3* 
3>23Bonham-Carter, p* 5»
The schemes of Brodrick and Arnold-Forster were still evident 
- like shipwrecks - to serve as a warning of the perilous course 
they sailed* The public was either apathetic or interested in 
a reduction in estimates* The government wanted changes in 
the army, but few were willing to vote the money to pay for 
them* Yet, progress had been made in the years that passed*
The War Office had been reorganized and the experiments and 
"trials and errors" of two War Ministers were not without 
value*
In any event, the legacy of the Boer War and the 
ill-fated, plans of Brodrick and Arnold-Forster provided the 
backdrop and the illumination without which the Haldane reforms 
cannot be properly evaluated.*
CHAPTER II
HALDANE ENTERS THE WAR OFFICE
A Government is Formed,
It was winter in England. Hie year was 1905 and a new 
government was being Formed. Mr. Balfour1s Unionist govern­
ment had resigned, and the King summoned Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, the opposition leader, to form a government. 
Campbell-Bannerman immediately began to organize his cabinet. 
The leadership of the Liberal Party was, however, not united. 
There was a splinter group of the younger Liberals who were 
primarily composed of three young Liberal Imperialists,
Edward Grey, H.H. Asquith and Richard Haldane.-1-
Foreseeing the fall of the Unionist government, in 
September 1905$ Herbert Asquith, Edward Grey and Richard
*
Haldane met and discussed the probability of Campbell-Bannerman 
becoming Prime Minister. In order to preserve the progressive 
force in the Liberal Party, the trio resolved that 
Campbell-Bannerman should take a peerage, leaving Asquith 
to lead the party in the House of Commons. The three further 
decided that unless Campbell-Bannerman would consent to this, 
they would not enter the new government. This agreement was 
reached at a fishing lodge near Relugas, Scotland, and
^-Edward, G. Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916 (2 vol s.; 
New York: Frederick A* Stokes Co., 1925)$ Vol. I, pp. 60-62*
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thereafter was referred to by the three conspirators as 
,fThe Relugas Compact •1,2
The jnext step was to secure the cooperation of 
King Edward VII. On 12 September 1905* Haldane wrote 
Lord Khollys a letter in which he explained the stand that 
he, Asquith and Grey had taken. He further pointed out that 
they did not wish to cause embarrassment to the King, but 
that action should be taken fairly soon.^ Lord Knollys 
replied on 16 September that he personally agreed with the 
views of Haldane and his colleagues; however, in the interests 
of harmony, it might be more advantageous to allow Campbell- 
Bannerman to assume the Premiership and then retire to the 
House of Lords after approximately one year's service.^ 
Haldane indicated to Lord Khollys that a six month to one year 
waiting period would not be agreeable since a severe policy
5
split in the party could arise in that time period. On 
25 September, Lord Knollys Indicated his personal agreement 
with Haldane's views and replied that he had shown the
2Richard B. Haldane, An Autobiography (Garden Cityi 
Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1929)* pp. 169-171*
3lbid.. pp. 171-172.
liIbid. Haldane indicates in his autobiography that 
Knollys suggested a six or twelve month period for Campbell- 
Bannerman to lead in the Commons. Maurice. Vol. I, p. 152, 
reprints the Knollys letter which states, • . . a certain 
time, say a year for instance.11
*
^Haldane, p. 172.
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correspondence to the King who gave his approval.
On the ^th of October, the King summoned Haldane to 
Balmoral and. gave his blessing to the basic aims of the 
"Relugas Compact." It now remained for Asquith to inform 
the aging, yet steadfast, Campbell-Bannerman of the Relugas 
ultimatum.^
On Monday, December 4, a day before Balfour1s resig­
nation, Sir Edward Grey visited Campbell-Bannerman and left 
no doubt that unless Sir Henry would accept a peerage, he
JjStZQyJ would, not serve in the cabinet. Campbell-Bannerman
7was understandably hurt and. angry.' On the following day,
Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman kissed hands and. the King took 
this opportunity to hint at a peerage because of the new 
Prime Minister*s age and failing health. Campbell-Bannerman, 
however, stated, his preference to begin his career as Prime 
Minister in the House of Commons.® On Wednesday, December 
6, Asquith went to see Campbell-Bannerman to plead the case 
for Grey, Haldane and himself. The Prime Minister remained 
steadfast and indicated that he would, have to discuss the 
matter with his wife. After consultation, the Campbell- 
Bannermans decided, to refuse retirement to the House of Lords
6Ibid., p. 173.
^Spender, Vol. II, pp. 193-19^
O
Haldane, pp. 180-181. Campbell-Bannerman was so 
distraught that he actually forgot to kiss the King*s hands, 
a formal part of the ceremony• The King graciously considered, 
it done•
Uo
and advised Asquith accordingly. Campbell-Bannerman then
made a counter offer; he tendered Asquith the post of
Chancellor of the Exchecquer and. authorized him to offer Grey
the Foreign Office and Haldane the Home Office. Asquith
tried to convince the Prime Minister that Haldane would be
best fitted, for the "Woolsack." This cabinet berth was not
available since Sir Robert Reid had already been selected
i 9for the Lord. Chancellor s post. The perspicacious Esher had 
noted as early as October 6, that Haldane "• • .wants to be 
Chancellor, but the King - who would like it - says he has 
no chance. Reid will be preferred,. • • •
Ihe Relugas Compact began to collapse on the 7th of 
December when Asquith accepted, the Exchecquer post. A. The 
negotiations, however, continued and, later on Thursday, the 
Prime Minister offered the post of Attorney General to Haldane. 
"The last thing that was likely to appeal £to Haldane^. . • 
was the position of a Law Officer . . .  /he"7 had had the best
• TO
that the Bar itself could give. . . .  Haldane did not reply
immediately but sought out Lady Horner, an old friend, on whose 
judgment he placed considerable value.^ To Haldane1s doubts 
she answered* "The better for you to be a member of it 
/the government^ “ 'the worse for the King and public who
^Ibid. "The Woolsack" referred to the cushion upon 
which the Lord, Chancellor was traditionally seated.
10Brett (ed,), Vol. II, p. 115.
■^1Ibid. , Vol. II, p. 125.
^Haldane, p. 182.
13Ibid., p. 181..
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it 14cannot escape from it. Haldane was impressed, but still
undecided. He then went to see Grey and urged him to join in 
a consultation with Arthur Acland, a man whose advice they 
mutually respected. Acland. urged Haldane and Grey to join 
the government because he believed that the two young states­
men would, be able to do more for their party in the government 
than on the sidelines. Grey finally agreed with Haldane that 
he would come into the cabinet provided Haldane would do so 
also.*^ That same evening Haldane went to see the Prime 
Minister and told him that he could, bring Grey into the 
government but that he did. not want to be Attorney General. 
Campbell-Bannerman then offered him the Home Office. Haldane 
countered) "What about the War Office?" "Nobody," retorted 
Campbell-Bannerman, "will touch it with a pole." Haldane 
replied, "ihen give it to me. I will come in as War Secretary 
if Grey takes the Foreign Office. • • ."^6
Friday morning, Grey accepted the Foreign Office 
post. The Relugas agreement was dead and. a fateful week came 
to an end.. The government had. finally been formed.^
lifIbid., p. 190.
1^Ibid., pp. 184-185.
17Ibid.« p. 194. , Haldane later wrote that he felt 
it was the King1s wish that he become War Minister; however, 
the writer was unable to corroborate this with any other 
source.
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There was no love lost between Campbell-Bannerman and 
Haldane; Sir Henry suspected, that Haldane was the instigator 
of the Relugas Plot, and. was wary of his new War Minister.
The War Office was considered, a grave for Parliamentary 
ambitions and Campbell-Bannerman was reputed to have said,
"■We shall now see how Schopenhauer gets on in the Kailyard.."^® 
On 11 December, the new cabinet members went to the 
palace to accept the seals of office. ^ 9 xt was a foggy day 
and, soon after the ceremony the new ministers became lost in 
the murk. Haldane finally groped his way to the War Office 
and, exhausted, asked, the guard for a glass of water.
2D
"Certainly, Sir," came the alert reply, "Irish or Scotch?"
Thus began Haldanefs auspicious career as Secretary 
of State for War. Congratulations poured, in. Arnold-Forster 
wrote, " . . .  I see your appointment to the War Office with
i,p *i
deep satisfaction. • • • I wish you every success. King
l^ibid., p. 195• Schopenhauer was a nickname Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman used for Haldane, referring to Haldane1s 
translation of Schopenhauer's works into English. Kailyard 
was a term for barracks yard.
^ I t  is interesting at this point to digress and consi­
der the influence of women on the formation of this cabinet.
It is quite possible that this government would not have been 
constituted, in the same format had it not been for the actions 
of three women; Lady Campbell-Bannerman definitely influenced 
her husband to remain in the Commons, Spender, Vol. II, p. 195* 
Lady Grey told, her husband., "if we had refused office, we could 
not have justified the decision to the constituents," Grey,
Vol. I, p. 61. There is also no doubt that Lady Horner's 
advice had considerable influence on Haldane, Haldane, p. 190.
^°Ibid., p. 196.
^Arnold-Forster, Memoir, p. 297*
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Edward wrote, "Mr. Haldane‘with sound common sense & great 
powers of organizing ought to make an excellent War Minister,
h22which is much needed as his predecessor was hopeless.
The new War Minister soon met with his generals. The 
wary senior officers inquired as to Haldane's plans for the 
army. The witty War Minister quipped, ". . • 1 was as a 
young and blushing virgin just united to a bronzed warrior, 
and that it was not expected by the public that any result 
of the union should appear until at least nine months had 
passed .**23 xhe generals, having witnessed the army being 
buffeted about by Haldane's two predecessors, were curious 
about the new War Minister's aims and qualifications for of­
fice. Their attitude is quite understandable. Richard Haldane's 
credentials were bare of military experience and it would have 
been difficult to find a minister with a lesser knowledge of 
military concepts.
Haldane: Scholar, Philosopher, Lawyer
Richard Burdon Haldane was born 30 July 18j>6 , in the
Haldane townhouse, a few steps from the house in Edinburgh
24where five years later Douglas Haig was born. The Haldanes 
lived mostly in the Scottish countryside at Cloan and were a 
close-knit, religious family. Richard's father was a
22Harold Nicholson, King George The Fifth, His Life and 
Reign (Garden City: Doubleday and" CoT," Inc., 1953)V P« 93*
^Haldane, p. 196.
24xerraine, p. 4.
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moderately successful lawyer of some local repute.^5
Young Richard went to school in Edinburgh and when the 
family was in residence in Cloan had a private tutor. He was 
soon steeped in Latin, Greek and the classics. At sixteen 
he entered, the University of Edinburgh and also studied at 
the University of London.*
Even in those early days Haldane nurtured an interest 
in philosophy and began to read voraciously of Hegel and other 
German philosophers. In 1874, one of his professors, J.S. 
Blackie, advised Richard to attend the University of Gottingen 
to pursue his love of philosophy. There is no doubt that the 
early years in Gottingen had. a profound influence on the 
young Haldane. His spiritual and intellectual ties with 
Germany were certainly formed in those student d.ays.^7
After five month's study, he returned to Cloan and 
re-entered the University of Edinburgh. His study of Kant, 
Hegel and Fichte soon earned him his master's degree. He 
continued toward a doctorate in philosophy, but failed to 
win approval of his thesis because the professor did not
i 28concur with Haldane's doctrines.
2^Haldane, p. 4.
^ Ibid., p. 7*
2 ^Ibid., pp. 13-18.
^Ibid. , pp. 21-23*
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It was during these years that Haldane also grew in
physical stature* He was a devoted, walker, a pastime shared
by his brothers, and. one time walked, seventy-three miles in
a day's time.^3
It had been a foregone conclusion within the family that
Haldane would, follow his father's footsteps into the legal
prof e ssion and in 1879, he entered Lincoln's Inn where his
long legal career began. Haldane was a careful and able
student endowed, with an exceptional memory,30 yet in his
first year as a lawyer he earned only L31»10s. By his fourth
31year, however, he had progressed to an income of L1100.
The young lawyer's reputation began to grow and soon Haldane
found himself swamped with cases. He was highly regarded in
legal circles and was particularly successful with cases
involving colonial constitutional law.32
At this point in his career Haldane also began to
enjoy the material fruits of his labors and he soon.became a
connoisseur of fine wines, excellent food and smoked, only the 
33best cigars.
In 1880, Haldane began his active interest in politics 
and became associated, with the forerunner of the Liberal
29ibid.» PP* 10-11.
3°ibid., pp. 34-35*
31lbid., p. 37*
^ I b i d . , pp. 46-4-7*
33pudley Sommer, Haldane of Cloan: His Life and Times,
1856-1928 (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., i960) , p. 52*
be
Imperialist Party. He became a member of the ''Eighty11 Club, 
a group of young Liberals ‘who would meet from time to time to 
4 discuss the political fortunes of the country.*^ In 1882, he 
met Herbert Henry Asquith. The two young men found many 
mutual interests and a great friendship was formed. In 1885, 
Richard Burdon Haldane stood for Parliament as a Liberal and 
was elected from East Lothian, a constituency which he 
continued to represent until he was raised to the peerage in
1 9 1 1 .35
Edward Grey soon became a companion of Asquith,
Haldane and the group of young Liberals. In 1886, Haldane 
induced Asquith to stand for Parliament and he was subsequently 
elected from a neighboring constituency of East Fife.^6
The young politician began to broaden his social horizons 
and soon was a welcome guest in the best salons of London 
society. Lawyer and politician, Haldane did not neglect his 
first love, philosophy. He became an authority on 
Schopenhauer and continued on summer trips to Germany to 
further his research. In 1903» Haldane was invited to deliver 
the Gifford lectures at the University of St. Andrews, a 
crowning tribute to Haldane's stature as a philosopher.3?
^Haldane, p. 86.
35jbxd., p. 52.
36Ibid.. p. 112.
37ibid.. p. 98.
J+7
This was the Haldane who confronted the Generals: a
skilled, lawyer, a consummate politician and an avid philos­
opher; a trained intellect, a scholarly man with tremendous 
capacity for work.^8 A contemporary writer referred to him 
as 11 • • • an intellectual steam engine.11-^ Haldane also was 
an effective orator* He was able to speak for hours and in 
great detail* His speeches were likened to a 11 * * * round 
of beef - you may cut and come again.11 ^  As an administrator 
Haldane had few peers.
This unique composite was Richard Haldane, the new 
Secretary of State for War. Even though he was fated to 
return to the highest position in the field of law before leav­
ing public service, it was his work for the army that was to 
bring him his most lasting fame; ironically, the very field 
for which his background and accomplishments seemed to fit 
him least.
The Early Hays
Haldane immediately launched into the study of army 
problems; his aim was first to win the confidence of his 
generals, select his staff, and then cope with needed reforms. 
Mr. Haldane did not enter the War Office with a pre-formed
3^Sommer, p. 102.
*^A.G. Gardiner, Prophets, Priests and. Kings (London: 
Alston Rivers, Ltd., 19087, p. 20JI *
^ Ibid.. Haldane1 s speeches often lasted for many 
hours. He was not a demonstrative, emotional speaker. His 
legal training, however, was reflected in his ability to 
speak logically and factually.
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plan. His first task vias to seek out the experts to learn 
from them the problems which confronted the War Office and
iii
the army. Haldane soon met with the Chief of .Staff who
said to him, nAt least, Mr. Secretary, you come to these
matters with a virgin mind.1 Haldane retorted, "Yes, and
a virgin mind is better than Arnold-Torster1s immaculate 
n 42conceptions.
The astute Esher predicted nThe new Secretary of State 
cannot fail to do well, above all he has determined to walk 
slowly and has no preconceived ideas. He is adroit, shrewd 
and exceedingly clever.11^  Esher acted quickly and on the
day that Haldane accepted the seals of office, proposed
i 44Colonel Gerald Ellison for the post of Haldane s Secretary.
Haldane readily admitted his ignorance of military affairs and
his need for a highly qualified officer to assist him. He
wasted little time in accepting Colonel Ellison as his
Secretary.45 When offered the post, Ellison 11 * . • asked at
once whether Mr. Haldane had any cut and, dried plans of his
own for the Army. . . .1 Lord Esher assured him that Haldane
did not. Ellison then offered to do whatever he could to
41
Robertson, Vol. I, p. 30.
^Sommer, p. 166.
43B rett (ed..), Vol. II, p. 132.
44jbid., pp. 126-127. Ellison had served as Secretary 
of the Esher Committee and was most knowledgeable of army 
affairs.
^Haldane, pp. 196-197*
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assist the new War Minister.^ Ellison and Haldane began a 
close working relationship and the War Secretary commented, 
"Ellison proved, to be all and more than all X had. hoped
The War Minister continued to build his staffs
Charles Harris became the head of the Financial Department
1,0
of the War Office;'4'0 Major General Spencer Ewart was trans­
ferred to the War Office and became Director of Military 
Operations; and Major General Sir William Nicholson became 
Quartermaster-General* Major General Douglas Haig was 
brought in later as Director of Military Training and 
rounded out the team in April 1906.^°
Haldane then began an intensive course of study* The 
books of Bronsart von Schellendorf, Von der Goltz, and
46Ernest Merle Teagarden, "The Haldane Army Reforms, 
1905-1912"(Unpublished. Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, 
Western Reserve University, 1962), pp. 41-42, citing Sir 
Gerald. Ellison, "Reminiscences of Lieutenant-General Sir 
Gerald Ellison," The Lancashire Lad, Journal of the Loyal 
Regiment (North-Lancashire), XVXI (February 1936), p. 1.
^Haldane, p. 197-
48
Ibid., pp. 199-200.
49John Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig (New York: 
Charles Scribner * s Sons, 1929) > p^ JB"!
50Terraine, pp. 39-40. The caliber of officers serving 
on this picked General Staff is reflected in the later careers 
of these distinguished, officers. Nicholson was destined to 
become the first Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Haig 
also won the Field-Marshall1s baton and led British Forces in 
World War I; Colonels William Robertson and Sir Henry Wilson, 
who served on the staff, both became Chiefs of the Imperial 
General Staff. Actually, Ewart replaced Major General 
Grierson as Director of Military Operations and Grierson took 
command of the 1st Division of the British Expeditionary Force. 
Charteris, p. 38, and Dunlop, p. 262.
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Clausewitz, as well as the writings of Ardant du Ficq, were 
closely studied, by the new War Minister who steeped himself in 
the principles enunciated by these authorities of the military 
prof;ession.^
The January elections were approaching and Haldane, 
taking Ellison with him, wont home to Cloan to campaign for 
re-election. The two men continued their study of army 
problems working in long sessions that often ended at one or 
two o fclock in the morning. "Hour after hour we would walk 
backwards and forwards in a big billiard room, Mr. Haldane 
on one side of the table smoking the best cigars procurable,
I on the other. . ." wrote Ellison. ^  Haldane soon reduced 
the problem to its simplest terms, ". • • What must be our 
objective . . .  What was required for its attainment?
The Military Conversations of 1906
The January elections occupied the center stage while 
a development of far-reaching consequences to Haldane1s plans 
for the army was waiting in the wings.
On 12 January, Sir Edward. Grey met Haldane at
•'^Haldane, p. 198. Clausewitz, Von der Goltz and 
du Picq were authorities and writers on military subjects. 
Bronsart von Schellendorf * s book on the German General Staff 
was considered a military classic.
-^Terrains, p. 39V quoting from Ellison, Lancashire Lad, 
XVIX (February 1936), p. 1.
^Haldane, p. 200.
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Berwick.-^ He invited Haldane for a drive and informed the 
War Minister that the french had indications of a possible 
German Attack on France in the spring• The question was, 
Would England support France and had any discussion taken 
place between the French and British staffs7 Even though 
this news may have surprised. Grey and, Haldane, the possi­
bility of a war between France and Germany had been 
explored by some of the army staff.
The assumption was made, that Britain would come to 
the assistance of France. The only question seemed to be 
whether or not Germany would violate Belgium1s neutrality. 
However, England1s participation in a French and German 
conflict at that time generated only an academic interest*^
Edward Grey did not have knowledge of any existing 
plans between France and. England in the event of a German 
t h r e a t , n o r  is there any evidence that Haldane was anything
•5^There seems to be a difference of opinions among 
historians whether this meeting took place on 12 January or 
13 January. Maurice, Vol. XI, p. 261, states it was 
the twelfth; Dunlop, p. 236, places the meeting on January 
13> Grey, p. 73» and Haldane, p. 202, indicate only that the 
meeting took place between 10 January and 15 January. Even 
though the date is not firmly established by British 
documents, an analysi s of other happenings indicates that 
12 January was the most probable date.
^Haldane, pp. 202-203.
^Robertson, Vol. I, pp. 2i*-26.
•57g t ey, p. 72.
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but surprised on that January day.
Haldane also received the following letters 
My dear Richard,
Persistent reports and little indications 
keep reaching me that Germany means to attack 
France in the spring. I don*t think these are 
more than the precautions and flourishes that 
Germany would naturally make apropos of the 
Morocco Conference. But they are not altoget­
her to be disregarded. A situation might arise 
presently in which popular feeling might com­
pel the Government to go to the help of France 
and you might suddenly be asked what you could 
do. Fisher says he is ready, by which I take 
it he means that his ships are so placed that 
he can drive the German Fleet off the sea and 
into shelter at any time. X donft want you 
to give any definite answer in a hurry but X 
think you should be preparing one.
Yours ever,
E. Grey*58
Actually the pot had begun to boil earlier. On 28 December
tLieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington, the military 
correspondent of the Times was approached by Major Huguet, 
the French military attache, who expressed some concern as 
to what the attitude of England*s new government would be 
in the event of an attack on France by Germany. Repington 
immediately passed this information on to Grey. The Foreign 
Minister replied that he did not disavow any agreements 
Lord Lansdowne, his predecessor, may have had with the
^ Maurice, Vol. I, pp. 172-173. This letter indi­
cates a considerable lack of coordination between the War 
Office, the Admiralty and Foreign Office on matters of 
contingency planning to support political aims.
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F r e n c h . 39 Repington then consulted with Esher and Clarke 
of the Imperial Defense Committee. They suggested that 
Repington prepare a short list of questions concerning 
Anglo-French military cooperation and submit them to Major 
Huguet. Lieutenant-Colonel Repington did so and returned 
the French answers to the oomraittoe on 12 January.^
On 10 January, Sir Edward Grey recorded a discussion 
with the French Ambassador, Mr. Paul Cambon, who intimated 
”• • • that he did not believe that the German Emperor de­
sired war but • • • was pursuing a very dangerous policy.
Cambon further iterated that, ”lt was not necessary . . .  that 
there should be any formal alliance . . .  the French govern­
ment should /Soiwever7 know beforehand whether . . .  Great
62Britain would be prepared to render France armed assistance.”
Grey retorted that in his personal opinion, ”. . • England.
would be strongly moved, in favour of France,” in the event
63of a German attack on France. Grey also suggested that 
59Great Britain, British Documents on the Origin of the 
War, 1898-191^ (eds.) G.P. Gooch and H. Temperley, Vol. Ill;
The Testing of the Entente, 190^-1906 (London: His Majesty1s
Stationery Off ice, 1928), p. I69, hereafter cited "British 
Documents.”
60Ibid.
^Ibid. , p. 170. Letter from Sir Edward Grey to 
Sir F. Bertie.
62Ibid.
6 3 I b i d .
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unofficial planning between the War Office and the French 
representatives should take place.
On 11 January, Major-General Grierson was queried on 
the matter of Anglo-French military commitments. He 
immediately urged that exploratory conversations between the 
British and French General Staffs be conducted provided, the 
British government would not be committed to any specific 
action.&k
These were the events which had passed prior to 
Grey and Haldane*s meeting during their election respite.
The Foreign and War Ministers agreed that before anything 
further could be done the Prime Minister should be consulted. 
Haldane then left for London and conferred with Campbell- 
Bannerman, ^ 3 -who ordered, that it be made absolutely clear 
that the conversations between the General Staffs should be
noncommittal and that the government would not be bound by
66them. On 15 January, staff conversations were officially 
authorized with Major-General Grierson representing the 
British government. Again, everyone involved was careful 
to state that neither government would be committed.^ 
Haldane also directed Major-General Grierson to initiate a 
study to determine the best means of supporting the French
6**Tbid.. pp. 171-173* Memorandum by Lord Sanderson 
to E. Grey, and letter from Major-General J.M. Grierson 
to Lord Sanderson.
^Haldane, p. 203*
66Spender, Vol. XX, p. 253.
^7Great Britain, British Documents. Vol. Ill, p. 177*
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mxlitary •
Haldane immediately recognized this as a new problem 
for the army. Time requirements for mobilization and tbe 
size of a striking force became immediate considerations. 
After all, Britain 11 ♦ • • had never contemplated the 
preparation of armies for warfare of the Continental type."^ 
Matters continued, to progress rapidly.
On 16 January, Grierson wrote Lieutenant-Colonel 
Barnardistpn, the British attache in Belgium, 1 • • • we are 
prepared, to put in the field., • ♦ • L Cavalry Brigades, 2 Army 
Corps and a division of mounted infantry* . • • The total num­
bers will be about 105 thousand. • • Grierson*s
estimate proved to be somewhat optimistic. As the British 
Staff began to evaluate their resources, the estimate of 
available force was reduced, to 80,000 m e n * ^  The British 
military structure was not capable of supporting a larger 
requirement at the time. There was one Army Corps at Aider- 
shot j the remainder of the Regular Army was organized at the
68Haldane, p. 20L.
6 9
Richard B, Haldane, Before the War (London:
Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1920), p. 31*
70Great Britain, British Documents, Vol. Ill, p. 179*
^Maurice, Vol, XI, p. 262.
Battalion and Regimental level and few units of Brigade 
size existed. There was a shortage of horses, men, artil­
lery and ammunition and the Auxiliaries were more than
somewhat disorganized«^ The best estimate for placing this
73force of 80,000 men into the field was two months. Sir 
Edward Grey, informed that 30,000 men were all that was 
available, commented, ft. • • That won’t save France unless 
she can save herself.
The need, for a British Expeditionary Force was with­
out a doubt established. The military conversations were 
the genesis of the Expeditionary Force. The new Ttfar Minister 
had received his “Marching Orders."
^Robertson, Vol. I, pp. 27-28.
^Haldane, Before the War, p. 32.
7L
Great Britain, British Documents, Vol. XXX, p. 178. 
Letter from Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.
CHAPTER III 
CREATION OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
The Beginnings
The Liberals* resounding victory at the polls'*' ■
enabled Haldane to devote all his energy to the matter
at hand - army reform. The military conversations added, 
a pressing urgency and Haldane applied himself to the prob­
lem of providing, a striking force for the British Army.
He -was, however, faced with several political considera­
tions; the victorious Liberals had little interest in the 
army. The resounding cry was for social reform and the
money for these plans would have to come from the army
budget.^ ,fArmy Estimates as in 18991*1 was another 
popular slogan.^ Haldane was cautioned, **Do not attempt 
great improvements. The attempt will fail. But concentrate 
yourself on reducing the estimates.1* To this the astute 
War Minister countered, “. . • that economy and efficiency 
were not incompatible.
■^Haldane, An Autobio graph y , p. 22h„
^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 178.
^Terraine,’ p. 38.
^Haldane, An Autobiography, p. 199*
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With these political realities firmly in mind 
Haldane began to carve out the foundation of the Expedi­
tionary Force. Aided, by Ellison and Harris, an objective 
■was determined. German sea power was growing, and. the 
spectre of a Continental war was visible in the far-off 
distance. The seeds for an England committed to aid an 
embattled France had already been sown. An expeditionary 
force which could be mobilized quickly to succor a French 
army in the event of German attack t\ras, therefore, a prime 
consideration.*^
*
This striking force, of course, did not exist.
". . • Hardly a brigade could have been sent to the
Continent without being recast.11 Nor was there sufficient
artillery, transport, or medical support to employ a sizable
force. Fifteen days %i?ere considered the maximum mobilization 
7
time •
The energetic War Minister consulted with his 
generals and worked ceaselessly. The hard work agreed with 
Haldane, "l am enjoying myself hugely,M he wrote, "The work 
of thinking out and. executing organisation delights me. My
g
Generals are like angels."
•5Ibid.., p. 200. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court 
Repington claims predit for coining the term, "Expeditionary 
Force." Charles a Court Repington, The First World War, 
191^-1918 (2 vols.j Londons Constable and Company, Ltd.,
1920), Vol. I, p. 1U.
/T
Haldane, An Autobiography, p. 201.
7Ibid.
^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 171.
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A formula soon began to emerge and a general outline 
of the Expeditionary Force was completed on 29 January 
1906.9 The Expeditionary Force would, consist of six large 
infantry divisions and one cavalry division. This force 
was to be augmented by artillery, ordnance, supply, medical, 
and support units.
While Haldane worked on the army problem, the cry
for a reduction in estimates swelled; the radical Liberals
had to be placated. Haldane was an astute politician and,
would not be rushed into making precipitate plans or render
hasty judgments. This was demonstrated in his speech
delivered in Parliament on 8 March 1906, which opened the
debate on the 1906-1907 estimates. Launching his army reform
campaign with the utmost prudence, caution, and, modesty, the
War Minister began:
. . .  I address the House with unfeigned diffidence.
My predecessors, or many of them, have been people 
of great military knowledge. Never did a Minister 
rise to address this House on subjects connected 
with his Department with less preposition. Whether 
that is a merit or not, it has at least enabled me 
to approach the consideration of the questions 
which I had to face in the beginning of last Decem­
ber with an open mind.H
The address continued, for nearly three hours. Haldane deftly
^Teagarden, "The Haldane Army Reforms, 1 p« 60, citing 
a letter from Haldane to his mother, Haldane Papers.
•^Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 201-202.
^^Richard B. Haldane, Army Reform and Other Addresses 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), pi 51 hereafter cited as 
"Army Reform." This speech may also be found, in Pari. Debs., 
4, CLIII (1906).
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expounded his reform philosophy, at the same time insured 
that his colleagues understood that these were merely ideas 
and that time was needed for a full study of the problem.
He paid, tribute to the "• » • New school of young officers.
it 12• . • He defined the financial problems of the army and
the many necessary expenditures which he had inherited due to
existing army policies.^ The costs of maintaining a soldier
in the colonial garrisons also were evaluated; the annual cost
1Uof maintaining a soldier serving in South Africa was 150, 
a substantial amount of money in 1906.
Haldane did not fail to pledge his allegiance to the
"Blue-Water Principle" for the defense of England.
• #•
Reductions were necessary to lower the estimates.
Shore defenses came under Haldane,s fire and were marked for 
elimination since the navy was considered fully capable of 
defending England.1 s coasts.^ The wastage of unused stores 
had been discovered by Haldanets probing eye and large stocks 
of obsolete equipment were to be disposed of. A native 
regiment at Wei-hai-wei, China, x$hich cost L20,000 a year
•^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 4.
13Ibid., pp. 4-5.
ljjTbid., p. 9 * L150 equated to approximately $600.
'•^Ibid.3 pp. 13-15* cf. Maurice Vol. I, p. 179*
The Blue-Xtfater Doctrine placed primary reliance on the navy 
to protect England from invasions, thereby reducing the 
need for a large "Home Army."
•^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 14.
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upkeep and served no useful purpose, was also sacrificed, on
the altar of economy* ^
Haldane then proceeded to provide a masterful insight
to his philosophy and military concepts. Contrasting the
military problem of Great Britain to that of other nations
he proclaimed:
They have only one war to contemplate on a large 
scale, and that is with their neighbors across 
the border. They have to be ready to mobilise 
and to fight within perhaps ten days from the 
time of the order being given. Therefore they 
must be ready. It is absolutely necessary that 
their reserves should be trained up to the eyes 
and ready when called upon to take the field, at 
once. But the British Army is not like that.
We live on an island, and, our coasts are completely 
defended, by the Fleet. Our Army is wanted for pur­
poses abroad and. over-seas. It is necessarily a 
professional Army; we could not get such an Army 
by conscription’. It must be of high quality; but 
because of the limited nature of its functions 
-- to strike at a distance -- it ought to be of 
strictly limited dimensions. Have we ever thought, 
scientifically and clearly, what these dimensions 
ought to be? X do not think so. I know that 
certain things have been worked out, but X do not 
think the whole problem has been dealt with in its 
entirety. Here is an island, the striking force of 
which does not exist for the defence of these 
coasts —  it does not exist merely for our own 
insular interests. This*island is the centre of 
an Empire consisting of nearly 12,000,000 square 
miles and including some ^00,000,000 of population, 
and we have to protect the distant shores of that 
Empire from the attack of the invader. We want, 
therefore, an Army which is very mobile and. capable
17Ibid., p. 18
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of rapid transport* For fighting which has to b© 
at a distance and, cannot be against large masses 
of men it ought to be upon a strictly limited 
scale, and perfect rather in quality than expanded, 
in quantity. There never has been enough careful 
thinking about this problem. If the Army is not 
■wanted, for home defence, then its size is something 
which is callable of being calculated. The size of 
the expeditionary force is the principal ingredient 
in the present cost of the Army.-^
The War Minister only cursorily touched on militia and volun­
teer problems; however, he recommended that they should, be 
drawn closer to the Regular A r m y . He also pointed out the 
necessity of education for British officers and advanced the
idea of a degree in military s c i e n c e . H e  ended his excel­
lent speech with this disarming comments
I have outlined no scheme tonight —  I have merely 
thrown out ideas which have resulted from such study 
as I have so far made of the subject. I may be 
wrong in thinking that progress is possible along
those lines; but I do not think I am.^l
Haldane did not hesitate to warn his colleagues, nDo
not force me to handle the Army rapidly. Do not force upon
me things which I could not do and which I would rather
resign my office than try to do. • • •
The blueprint of the Haldane reforms was firmly drawn
and the faction pressing for a lowering of the estimates had
•j O
Ibid., pp. 2lh-25. cf. Dunlop, p. 2^9; Maurice, 
Vol. I, p . l&oj and Pari. Debs., %, CLIII (1906), pp. 673-
675.
■^Haldane, Army Reform, pp. 28-29*
20Ibid., p. 36.
2lIbid., p. 38.
22Ibid.
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been masterfully placated with, a reduction of L17,000 from 
the preceding army budget.2^
Launching the Expeditionary Force Scheme
There was some grumbling opposition from both the
Conservative and Liberal benches. H.O. Arnold-Forster, now
a stalwart of the Opposition, objected to Haldane's plan for
augmenting and expanding the Regular Army in time of war.
The ex-War Minister contended that his scheme of a Home Army
oh,was far superior. Balfour pointed out that a reduction of
r
troops was not compatible with the theory of an expandable 
army.2^
Rumors of impending troop reductions were soon rife 
in the House of Commons and. at Edward.1 s Court. A rumored cut 
of ten infantry battalions, a substantial number of artil­
lery batteries and a reduction in colonial troops readily
26gained, currency. Viscount Esher, the loyal watchdog of
the army, wrote the King on 1 April 1906, concerning the
proposal to reduce the guards, and. picturesquely pointed
out, ,jTo reduce the Guards Brigade at Aldershot is to knock
,,2 7the point off the spear and to blunt the weapon. • . .
2^Ibid., p. 6. cf. Maurice, Vol. I, p. 181. The 
1905-1906 army expenditure was £.28,4*78,863. The Liberals 
were expecting a reduced estimate of £25*000,000. However, 
they had to be satisfied with a reduction of £17*000.
2^Parl. Debs., 4, CLXV (1906), cf. Arnold-Forster, 
Memoir, pp. 301-306.
25parl« Debs., h, CLIV (1906), p. H*6l.
^Maurice, Vol. 1, p. 182.
S^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 156-157.
6k
He further related that he had. discussed this matter with 
Mr. Haldane and hoped for the best. Nor did the King hesi­
tate in advising the War Minister of the Royal objections to
og
a reduction of the South African garrison. On this point,
however, ‘Esher was able to assure his sovereign that if
reductions of infantry were to bo made in South Afrioa, the
29units would, be replaced, by cavalry.
The possibility of a reduction in artillery also 
drew the fire of two ex-War Ministers, now turned, critics.
Mr. Brodrick and Mr. Arnold-Forster both considered artil­
lery a necessary ingredient in Englandfs army, the reduction
30of which they considered a national calamity.
On 12 July, Mr. Haldane was ready to place his pro­
posals before Commons.; The House was packed, the galleries 
crowded, as he rose to speak. This time there was no polite
modesty; confidence and assurance were the keynotes as Haldane
31began on a somber note, "i believe there is hardly a
Member who is not highly convinced that the state of our 
national Forces is profoundly unsatisfactory• This state­
ment referred both to cost and to organization. Haldane 
pointed out the need to H. • • restore public confidence in
28Lee, Vol. II, pp. 4*84*-4*8.5.
29Brett <ed.), Vol. II, p. 15^.
^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 183*
-^Dunlop, p. 253*
3 2 H a l d . a n e ,  Army Reform, p. 4*1. This speech is also 
quoted in its entirety in Pari. Debs., k, CLX (1906), pp.
1 0 7 9 - H 2 0  •
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the Army* • • , and to make people realize that in their 
army they are getting fair value for their money* The Army 
must be reorganized, so that it can be efficiently used in 
war* M • • • An Army shaped, for the only purpose for which an 
Army is needed - the purpose of war."*^* This was Haldane's 
stated purpose as he began to unfold his plan* He 
acknowledged the compatibility of economy and efficiency, 
yet each officer, each soldier, each piece of equipment had 
to be measured by the yardstick of its value and contribution 
for w a r . ^  The War Minister also made it clear that the 
Regular Army's purpose was for war overseas. The fleet was 
charged with defense of English coasts.^
The Plan is Unveiled ;
Haldane then unveiled his plan for the Expeditionary 
Force; the result of four months' study. He proposed, an 
organization of six large infantry divisions, complete with 
support forces; four cavalry brigades; and artillery. A 
force of one hundred fifty thousand men, composed of fifty
^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 4*1.
^Xbid. , p. 4*3#
3-5Ibid., p. 4*6.
^^Xbid.
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thousand Regulars, seventy thousand Reservists and thirty 
thousand Militia was required to man this organization.-^ 
Haldane*s basic aim was to man the Expeditionary Force with 
the required infantry, artillery, cavalry, and support 
services; abolish whatever troops proved excess, and use 
the monetary surplus to lower the estimates. Only cavalry 
units were to be excepted from planned reductions.^
Artillery was the next consideration. Even though 
there were ninety-three batteries of field artillery in 
existence, sufficient manning was available to mobilize* only 
forty-two of them. The new quick-firing guns required, larger 
amounts of ammunition to support them and no provision had 
been made for this. The state of artillery was an inheritance 
from Mr. Haldane 1s two predecessors who complained most 
loudly about artillery reductions.^
Sixty-three artillery batteries with ammunition 
columns were required, to support the Expeditionary Force.
^ Xbid., p. 5^* Haldane* s plan for the Expeditionary 
Force was without doubt based on the Cardwell system of 
"linked battalions." Haldane used a twelve-battalion In­
fantry Division as his base organization. There were suf­
ficient Infantry Battalions in England, to provide six 
divisions leaving a surplus of eight battalions. By 1909, 
the War Minister perfected the Cardwellian equation, return­
ing eleven battalions from overseas garrisons to England.
This leveled the force to seventy-four battalions at home and 
a like number in the colonies. E.G. Grey, et al., Vi scount 
Haldane of Cloan, P.M., The Man and His Work (London:
Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 11-12, 
hereafter cited as "Viscount Haldane."
-^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 55* cf. Dunlop, p. 255, 
and Sommer, p. 173*
39 ^Haldane, Army Reform, pp. 5o“57*
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To fully man these batteries, Haldane proposed, the dissol­
ution of the Militia Royal Garrison Artillery. The transfer 
of the coast defense mission to the Navy made this artillery 
arm surplus. Thirty-six additional batteries -would be 
formed to provide training and reserve function. The older 
guns were to be issued to Volunteers, a significant departure 
from previous concepts.^ In addition, ten horse artillery 
batteries were slated to join the Expeditionary force 
providing a total of seventy-three artillery batteries for 
Haldane1 s envisioned, “strike Force.1’ The revamped artillery 
structure, claimed Haldane, would reduce estimates by 
L300,000 annually.^
Disposing of the artillery problem, the War Minister 
turned to the infantry. Seventy-two infantry battalions were 
required for the proposed six divisions. The Guards would 
furnish six battalions; the remaining sixty-six battalions 
were to be provided from the Infantry of the L i n e . - i f r ©  
eight surplus battalions of the Line and two Guard battalions
hk *
were to be disbanded. Haldane s plan further provided for 
the withdrawal of three infantry battalions from South Africa
^ Ibid., pp. 62-63*
^ I b i d . , p. 66.
^ Ibid., p. 63*
^ I b i d ., pp. 65-66.
^ I b i d . , p. 72.
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to be replaced by a cavalry regiment.
The Line Infantry Regiments identified for dissolu­
tion were the
Third and fourth battalions of the Northumberland 
Fusiliers, the third and fourth battalions of the 
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, the third and, fourth 
battalions of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and the 
third and fourth battalions of the Manchester
R e g i m e n t . ^
The Guard battalions to be disbanded were the third, battalion 
of the Scots Guards and the 3d Coldstrearns
Mr. Haldane also clarified his policies on enlistment. 
The Infantry term of service would be seven years with the 
colors, and five with the Reserves; the Guards would con­
tinue to serve three and nine; and the Cavalry soldier was 
obligated to seven and five. Artillery units would serve for 
six years with the colors and six in the Reserves with the
exception of Garrison Artillery, which would, be enlisted, for
L8a term of eight and four years.
Having completed his recommendations for the Regular 
components of the army, Haldane proceeded to discuss the
^ I b i d . , p. 76.
U6Ibid., p;. 77* All of these units were considerably 
under-strength. The eight battalions combined were nearly 
1200 men short.
^^Ibid., pp. 75-76. The 3d Coldstreams were not to 
be disbanded until a tour of duty in Egypt was completed.
Later considerations saved this battalion from dissolution.
^ I b i d . , p .  78.
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Auxiliary Force. Hie Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry -were 
to be measured with the same yardstick as the Regular Army, 
"What purpose do you serve in war?"^
The Auxiliaries had become an expensive luxury 
during the last ten years. The Militia had decreased in 
strength to ninety thousand men, yet its annual cost had 
increased, by £,**30,000o The Yeomanry, now numbering 25*000, 
had, more than doubled, during the same period and cost an 
additional £,**20,000 a year.^® To the Militia, Haldane threw 
down the gauntlet, ". • • Either fall back into Volunteer 
work . . .  or else they must take upon themselves the same 
obligation as the regular soldier • • * to serve abroad in 
time of viar."^ Ihe functions of the Volunteers were also 
defined: to man the coastal defenses when Regular troops
went to war, to repel raids, and to act as a pseudo-reserve 
for the Regular Army. ^  Firm in his proposals for the 
Regular Army, the shrewd War Minister was not yet ready to 
fully outline his plans for the Auxiliary Forces, HWe are 
still in a state of consideration about the Auxiliary 
Forces. • • Haldane stated. An army of greater strength
^9Ibid., P* 00 ro •
'50Ibid. , P* 83.
•^1Ibi d ., p. 84.
*52Ibid., P* 87.
^Ibid. # p. •
CMQ\
> 70
at a lesser cost was the ultimate goal./'***
Action and Reaction
The speech was a success. Opposition was light and 
disorganized. Balfour was instrumental in restraining some 
of the Opposition when he stated, "We had failed to ijroduee 
an acceptable,scheme of Army reform. Haldane must be given 
his chance.11^
There was, however,,a conservative attempt to block 
Haldane1s program. On 19 July, F.E. Smith arose in the House 
of Commons and moved for adjournment, based on 11 • • . the 
avowed, intention of His Majesty1s government to commence 
forthwith reductions in His Majesty1s armed forces which have 
not received the sanction of Parliament• This attempt 
by the opposition was firmly defeated. Lord Esher recordsj 
nThe politicians . . .  debated his ^/Haldane fjs7  breeches of 
faith, and other silly political shibboleths, fixing as 
politicians always do on immaterial points.
Haldane had placated his party with reductions in the 
army. He fought now with closed ranks, and the opposition
•^ I b i d . , p. 93.
■^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 183.
•56Parl. Debs., U, CLX (1906), p. 2*18. 
■^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 171-172.
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crumbled,. It was time to translate theory into reality.
Haldane published his Memorandum on Army Reorganization 
on 30 July. This memorandum contained,, in essence, the main 
points of his 12 July speech. There were, however, a few 
changes. In his speech Haldane had referred to a Militia 
elements of thirty thousand, men to round out the Expeditionary 
Force; this force was now displaced by 3*240 Yeomanry, 10,337 
Artillerists, 2,425 Engineers and 10,775 Army Service Corps 
personnel. These were all referred to as "non-Regular." In 
addition, there were some 4,000 medical, veterinary and 
ordnance personnel. Also, the memorandum clarified the 
position of Militia Infantry. Battalions of Militia In­
fantry were to be trained as units and it was hoped that they
<58would, be sent overseas in that configuration.-^
Haldane wisely elected to enact his proposals for the 
Expeditionary Force without legislation.-^^ The actual 
reductions were implemented by Army Order 235 on 1 October.
With, the aid of Haldane's staff, Ellison, Nicholson, Ewart, 
Generals Douglas and. Haig, the British Expeditionary Force 
became a reality on 12 January 1907* by Special Army Order 
which established the new organization.^0
58Dunlop, pp. 259-260, citing Command Paper 2993
of 1906.
•^Ibid., p. 26l.
60Ibid., see Appendix A.
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Haldane had, accomplished the first milestone in his 
plan for the reform of the British Army. The Expeditionary 
Force was assembled and trained in the three year period, that 
followed. A small force by Continental standards, the 
British Expeditionary Force was honed into a high quality 
professional fighting unit. In 1914, when the call came, the
British Expeditionary Force was deployed to France in the
6lplanned period of twelve days.
It was on French soil that the f,01d ContemptiblesH 
earned the respect of friend and foe alike, and in their 
blood etched the word Valor into the tableau of British Army 
history.
61Grey, e t a l . , Viscount Haldane, p. .11
CHAPTER IV 
THE FORMATION OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Antecedent s
Haldane is often credited with the creation of the 
British General Staff* It would be more accurate, however, 
to state that Haldane translated theories into practice 
because it was he who made the General Staff a functioning 
body and furnished Britain* s army with a "Thinking
•I *
Department* 11
General Staffs, in some form, have existed as long 
as there have been armies. Julius Ceasar was surrounded, by 
a group of generals and. aides who transmitted and carried 
out his orders; Alexander the Great had, a staff of sorts; 
Frederick the Great had an extremely efficient staff system; 
and Napoleon Bonaparte had an excellent staff headed by the
p
famous General Berthier* It was, however, the Prussians 
who created, a General Staff along modern lines and used it as 
an instrument of victory* The German successes of 1870 were 
directly creditable to the brilliance and the organizational 
capability of the Prussian General Staff.^ The French, who
•^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 23*
2Gord.on, p. 95»
^Ibid*, p. 96.
73
7h
foil victim to this.splendid organization, immediately took
* Llsteps to create a similar General Staff, The Etat-Major.
Nor vias the staff idea entirely new in Britain. As 
early as l6h59 a Headquarters Staff headed by a Commander- 
in Chief was in existence. This group consisted of a 
small number of officers and civilians who represented basic 
military support functions, such as Supply, finance, Judge 
Advocacy, Chaplaincy, Administration, and Medicine.-^
Wellington also possessed an efficient and well 
organized staff; however, the staffs of the early British 
Army were primarily composed of specialists and did not 
function as either a planning or a policy-making organization.^ 
Nor is there evidence that any selection criteria was ap­
plied in order to obtain the best possible officers to 
serve in staff capacities. A Commander often selected his 
staff from his circle of friends or members of his family, who 
were personally congenial and not necessarily had ability to 
perform their duties.^
The first concrete proposal for a British Staff formed 
along modern lines was made in I89O by Lord Hartington in his 
report on the findings of the Hartington Commission. He
^Ibid.
•5j .D. Hittle, Hie Military Staff, Its History and 
Development (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing
Co., 1 9 ^ 1 7  p. 11^.
6Ibid., pp. 123-125.
^Sheppard., p. 481#
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recommended the creation of a General Staff headed by a Chief 
of Staff and organized in a manner similar to the staffs then
o
existing m  the armies of major European powers. Unfor­
tunately, this report was weakened by a strong conservative 
attitude prevalent in the army of Victoria. The Duke of 
Cambridge was distrustful of any reform or change in the 
existing army and the aging queen shared and. supported his 
opinions.9 The strength of Hartington1s recommendation was 
further diluted by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who, as a 
member of the Hartington Commission, submitted a dissenting 
minority report.
There were, however, individuals who realized 
Britain's desperate need for a General Staff organized along 
German lines. On the^same day that the Hartington Commission 
Report was signed, Spenser Wilkinson published his book,
The Brain of an Army.^^ Mr. Wilkinson explained the 
workings of the General Staff system in detail but more than 
that he grasped the importance of organized command, trans­
lated into effective and efficient application of military
power. The book served, to popularize the General Staff
12concept among both civilians and military officers. The
o
Amery, pp. 292-293* Xn Appendix F of his book,
Amery has reprinted a sizable extract from the Hartington 
Commission report.
9Supra, p. 16.
10Amery, pp. 293-29^.
~ "^Spenser Wilkinson, The Brain of an Army (2d. ed.; 
London: Constable and Co., L t d . , 1913)$ P * 5* .
12Hittle, pp. 132-133.
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great German General, Moltke, expressed, surprise that a 
mere civilian, and an Englishman at that, was able to capture 
and aptly describe the functioning of the General Staff 
system. ^
The influence of The Brain of an Army was not limited 
to England. Some of the roots of the American General Staff 
can also be traced, to Wilkinson's work.1** The title, The 
Brain of an Army, was particularly appropriate since the 
German General Staff was indeed the intellect of German 
military power.^
The German Model
The history of the Prussian staff can be traced to 
1655, when the Qreat Elector of Brandenburg appointed a 
Generalquartiermeister. This officer's position was similar 
to that of a Chief of the General Staff, however, he was not 
charged with the manifold, responsibilities which were later 
attached to this post. In 1796, a Cartographic Section was 
attached to the staff and other military functions were 
added, as they were found necessary to provide coordinated 
staff action. ^  In 1815, the German Staff was divided into 
two separate parts. Per Grosse Generalstab functioned at 
Berlin while the remaining Truppen-Generalstab served with
■^Wilkinson, pp. 9-11*
lJ*Hittle, p. 178.
1-5Xbid., pp. 131-132.
I g |
Charles a Court Repington, Imperial Strategy 
(London: John Murray, 1906), p. 137*
17Ibid.. p. 138.
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18
the troops. At first there was only a limited number of 
officers serving in this select organization. During the 
tenure of General Muffling, who served as Chief of the German 
General Staff from 1821 to 1829$ only forty-six officers 
served with this elite group. In 1870, when Germany mobilized 
against France, the staff had increased to 109 officers,19 
and, by 1890, the Prussian General Staff had grown to a total 
of 200 officers. Ninety of these served with staffs of the 
divisions in the Army Corps whereas the remainder were 
members of the Great General Staff at Berlin.^0
The German staff corps was an aristocracy of talent 
in every respect. They were an elite group separate from the 
remainder of the army, wearing distinctive uniforms, special 
insignia and their accelerated promotions issued directly from 
the Chief of Staff of the Army.^-*- Only the elite were chosen 
for duty with the General Staff. Each year only the top 
handful of graduates of the ICriegs Akademie (Staff College) 
were selected for duty with the Staff. After a year’s ser­
vice, these junior officers were returned to their regiments 
and continued rotating between staff and regimental
«L 8Ibid.. . Per Grosse Generalstab is translated literally 
as the great general staff. Per Truppen-Generalstab translates 
general staff of troops.
19Ibid., p. 139.
^Wilkinson, p. 13^»
21Ibid., pp. 131-133
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assignments as long as they showed progress.^
There is no doubt that Per Grosse Generalstab 
represented the epitome of organized military command function 
in the early 1900*s. However, neither Wilkinson nor members 
of the British military wanted an exact replica of the German 
Staff; rather, they wanted a staff tailored to British needs 
incorporating certain German concepts.^ Xt remained for the 
investigations which followed, the South African War to provide 
the spur for further action. The Esher Committee reported 
that the lack of planning, of preparation and of trained, 
staff officers during the Boer campaign ,f. . . gravely 
prejudiced the conduct of operations in South Africa.
Viscount Esherfs reconsideration to replace the office of 
Commander-in Chief with a General Staff began a ripple of 
change in the “ostrich like” attitude of the War Office.
The General Staff
In December of 1903* Viscount Esher advised Prime 
Minister Balfour, MIf Arnold-Forster is wise he • • • will 
throw all his energy into the creating of a . . . General
Staff. . . . ^he War Minister, H.O. Arnold-For ster did
22Xbid., p. 136. cf. Repington, Imperial Strategy, 
pp. 141-1^3•
Ibid.. pp. 137-166. cf. Hittle, p. 135. This 
short sketch of the German staff is necessary as it provides 
the roots from which the British staff grew.
2lf
Ibid., p. 133* cf. Repington, Imperial Strategy,
P. 1**7.
2 5Brett (ed.), Vol. II, p # 33* Again Esher exhibited 
his perspicacity in matters of army reform.
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not see fit to pay heed to this advice until almost his final 
hour in the War Office. It is true that under his regime and 
as a result of findings of the Esher Committee, a Chief of 
the General Staff had replaced the office of Commander-in 
C h i e f . H o w e v e r ,  as of yet the head did not have a body.
On 11 November 1903» Arnold-Forster published a memorandum 
which was addressed to the Chief of the General Staff. The 
memorandum laid a framework for the establishment of a British 
General Staff.^7
The major provisions of Arnold-Forster*s recommen­
dations were as follows] General Staff officers were to be 
selected on the basis of their personal qualifications. Only 
a small number of officers should be initially selected. A 
General Staff appointment was to be for four years and at the 
end of this period, the officer would be considered, for reten­
tion on the General Staff list. Accelerated promotion would 
be the reward for distinguished General Staff service.
Arnold-Forster further outlined a list of duties for 
General Staff officers. He insisted that the General Staff 
would, not be constituted as a separate corps as was the 
Prussian staff design; it was desired that officers selected 
for the General Staff were graduates of the Staff College, but
2^Supra., p. 23*
^H.O. Arnold-Forster, Military Needs and Military 
Policy (London: Smith, Elder and Co•, 1909)V PP* 193-207,
hereafter cited as “Military Needs.“ cf. Repington, Imperial 
Strategy, pp. 135-160.
this was not a mandatory requirement. Initially, an 
individual*s Army rank in relation to length of service would 
not affect appointment to the staff. General Staff promotions 
were to be controlled by the Chief of the General Staff and 
the officers of the General Staff would be directly respon­
sible to h i m . ^
With this memorandum Arnold-Forster provided a basic 
foundation for a General Staff system in Britain. Whether or 
not Arnold-Forster could have translated his theories into 
policy must remain conjecture as he was destined to leave 
office within a month*s time.^9
Lord Hartington, Spenser Wilkinson, Viscount Esher, 
and Colonel Repington had brought the need for a General Staff 
to the attention of the English government and the English 
people* The oft maligned Arnold-Forster had outlined a 
framework upon which the staff could, be built, yet the task 
of completion, and, of implementation fell to his successor, 
Haldane.30
Viscount Esher, as was typical of him, wasted little 
time in maiding his views on General Staff organization known 
to the new War Minister. Only eight days after Haldane had 
taken office, Lord Esher wrote a detailed, letter in which he
^^Ibid. Arnold-Forster*s reprint of his memorandum 
supplemented by Repington*s interpretation provides an 
excellent source for the 1905 General Staff Memorandum.
29 Supra, p. 31.
30Gordon, p. 98.
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presented his views and concepts for a British Staff 
Esher was not as impressed with the German system as some of 
his contemporaries* He wrote, "No foreign system is applic- 
able to the insular peculiarities of our Army* • • .'*32 
General Staff must have sufficient flexibility to provide for 
expansion in time of war* He further recommended that quali- 
fied officers should be placed on a General Staff list even 
though some of them were being utilized in other duties* He 
advised Haldane to select General Staff officers on a pro­
bationary term for one year, at the end of which time their 
appointments could be confirmed by the Chief of the General 
Staff, and that those officers who had not attended a Staff 
College be sent to the school after they were placed on the 
General Staff list . ^  \
The military voice of the Times* Colonel Repington, 
also let it be known that he favored "* • • the spirit and 
not the letter of the German General Staff* * * *
Haldane, knowing that Campbell-Bannerman had pre­
viously opposed the General Staff idea, shrewdly laid the 
groundwork for his plans in his speech to the House of 
Commons on 8 March 1906* He discussed the problems of the
3xBrett <ed.), Vol. XI, pp. 129-130.
32Ibid. 
33xbid.
^"Charles a Court Repington, Vestigia, Reminiscences ‘ 
of Peace and War (Bostons Houghton Mifflin Co *, 1909)»
P* 2J>9* hereafter cited "Vestigia.M
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South African War and. then continued:
Unlike the other great nations, we had never estab­
lished any thinking department for the British 
Army. If there had been such a thinking department 
it would have made out plans for the operations in 
South Africa . . . Those -who have read the account of 
. the Japanese campaign will know the' profound advantage 
of a thinking department embodied in the General Staff.
The late Government . . * laid the foundation of a 
General Staff. We have got to work it out. • •
Haldane relied heavily on the assistance of Colonel Ellison
and General Ewart, his Director of Military Operations, in the
formulation of the General Staff plan*^ Before reaching any
final conclusions, however, the War Minister felt that he
would like to see the German Army firsthand. He "managed"
an invitation from the German Emperor for himself and Ellison
and on August 29# 1906, arrived, in Germany.37 Mr. Haldane and
Colonel Ellison were impressed by what they saw, particularly,
the efficient functioning of the German Staff. The neatly
3
compartmented support functions were particularly impressive.' 
However, the principle which had the most profound influence 
on Haldane and was clearly reflected in his later creation 
of the General Staff, was a clear division of the functions
-^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 23*
“^ Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 21U-215.
^ Ibid., cf. Sommer, p. 179*
^Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 220-221.
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of command, training, and war operations from that of admin­
istration. 39
The Secretary of State for War continued his practice 
of drawing from the experts. He consulted with Spenser 
Wilkinson, a recognized “staff11 authority^ and, the ever 
present Esher also continued inundating Haldane with his 
advice. Lord Esher contended, that it was of major importance 
that the General Staff undergo a thorough and continual 
training program. This staff must be “. • • trained specially
to deal with large questions of preparation for war. • • •
On 12 September 1906, Haldane established the General 
Staff through means of an Army Order and a memorandum which
lip
he had personally written. ^ In this staff memorandum,
Mr. Haldane made it clear that a General Staff would not 
appear overnight but that it would, take time to train and 
establish such an instrument. He further stated that the 
General Staff, as an organization, must remain flexible and
-^Grey, et al., Viscount Haldane, p. 10. Arnold-Forster 
later attempted, to establish the fact that Haldane* s visit to 
Germany had no influence on the formation of the British Staff. 
He claimed that Haldane prepared the General Staff Order prior 
to his trip and, made no further changes before it was pub­
lished in September 1906. Arnold-Forster, Military Needs, 
pp. 192-193* Mr-Haldane claimed the contrary. Infra., P* 87.
A detailed examination of the General Staff Order, however,
weights the argument in Haldane’s favor and suggests
Mr. Arnold-Forster might have been suffering from "sour grapes."
^Spenser Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years, 187^-1909 
(Londons Constable and Co., Ltd., 1933)> pp. 305-306.
^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, p. 166.
^2Sommer, p. 173*
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that changes may need, to be made as the requirements of 
England and the Army change.^ “The General Staff,11 Haldane 
wrote, “will be judged by the men it produces. The
memorandum further contained a hint of future plans. 
r>. • • There is no reason,11 stated Haldane, “why its /the 
General Staff% sj influence should not extend ultimately far 
beyond these shores and India.
The Army Order was very similar to Mr. Arnold-Forster*s 
memorandum. Thp General Staff was divided into two functionss 
a General Staff at Army Headquarters and a General Staff ser­
ving in commands and districts. The Headquarters Staff 
would function as a policy-making body concerning itself with 
military training, staff duties and military operations. War 
planning, collection of intelligence, as well as the prepara­
tion of maps, codes and cyphers were also placed under the
k6purview of this select group.
The General Staff serving in the field was charged 
with advising the commanders and the staffs of the units they 
were serving, particularly in matters of professional education 
of officers and the training of troops. The Field Staff was
**3 The Times (London), September 13* 1906. This shows 
a clear reflection of the Esher influence.
^ I b i d . The Times carried a complete reprint of 
Haldane * s Memorandum as well as the General Staff Order in 
its 13 September issue.
■^5 Ibid.
Ibid, cf. A.R. Godwin-Austen, The Staff and the 
Staff College (Londoni Constable and Co.7 Ltd., 1927)7 
pp. Zk^Zkk. ,
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also responsible for insuring that the policy prescribed by 
Army Headquarters was carried out.^^
General. Staff* officers were to be selected from offi­
cers who were u• • . considered most likely to prove capable
of forming a school of progressive military thought*
These officers would be placed on an unpublished General 
Staff list and. posted to the staff as vacancies occurred. 
Appointments were to be for four years. At the end of that 
time an officer below the substantive rank of Lieutenant- 
Colonel would, be returned to his regiment for a one year 
period. The first year of staff service was to be probationary
and officers below the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, who were
not Staff College graduates, would be sent to the Staff College 
after the completion of the four years of General Staff service* 
Officers who distingui shed, themselves on the Staff would be
identified for accelerated, promotion and brevetted. up to and.
49including the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
Appendix A to the General Staff Order contained a 
detailed, list of Staff duties, covering the areas of military 
training, military education and military operations.^
^ T h e  Times (London), September 13* 1906.
48 Ibid.*
^9Ibid.
■^Ibid. The General Staff Order, after close in- 
spection, reveals a considerable German influence particularly 
in the dichotomy of staff organization* The framework of 
Arnold-Forster, the suggestions of Viscount Esher as well as 
the concepts enunciated by Spenser Wilkinson and General 
Bronsart von Schellendorf (Per Dienst des Generalstabes), 
are clearly in evidence*
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Initially, the General Staff at Army Headquarters was 
provided with an authorization of fifty-seven officers 
including three Major-Generals, six Colonels, twenty-one 
Lieutenant—Colonels and Majors and. twenty— seven Staff 
Captains. The portion of the Staff which was to be posted 
in the commands and districts was authorized one Major-General, 
six Brigadier-Generals, sixteen Colonels, fifty-four Lieutenant- 
Colonels and Majors, twelve Staff Captains and twenty-five 
Brigade Majors, a total of 114 officers. This table of 
authorization provided an aggregate of 171 officers* billets 
on the British General Staff. ^
Reactions to the General Staff Order were mixed*
Colonel Repington hailed the British General Staff as a 
". • • graft upon the rebel British stem, the greatest product 
of the schools of Berthier and of Moltke. • • • Arnold- 
Forster raised great "hue and cry." He proclaimed that the 
General Staff had been his creation and that he had been 
deprived of the honor and the credit to which he was 
entitled, ^  an argument he continued to pursue in a number of 
books which he wrote in the years that followed.
The majority of the Army welcomed its new "brain." 
However, there were some senior regimental officers who resented
•51 ibid.
52^ Repington, Vestigia, p. 2j?9o
■-^Arnold-Forster, Military Needs, pp. 193-208.
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Headquarters interference -with their commands. This group 
was in the minority and the General Staff soon became a
respected institution and junior and senior officers alike
<h.
competed freely for the choice posts.
The War Minister openly admitted the General Staff 
had not been an original idea with him. In a speech on 15 
September at Newcastle-on-Tyne, Mr* Haldane stamped the Staff 
idea "Made in Germany*" He credited the Hartington Com­
mission, the Esher Committee, and his predecessor, Mr* Arnold- 
Forster, with their contributions* The Army Council also came 
in for a share of the plaudits for the creation of this staff* 
Further, Mr* Haldane pointed out that there were "• * * many 
things, that would not have been there unless we had had 
repeated and frequent conversations with the German General 
Staff.m56
There is no doubt that many must share the credit 
for the creation of a British General Staff, yet it was 
Haldane who took an idea which had been smoldering in the War 
Office for sixteen years, and brought it to fruition. ^  Nor 
was the War Minister content with this accomplishment as he 
clearly foresaw the need to expand the "Thinking Department" 
of the British Army to encompass the military forces of the
•^Godwin-Austen, pp. zb5~2U6 o
^ The Times (London), September 15* 1906.
^Ibid.
•^Repington, Vestigia, pp* 259-260.
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entire Empire.
The Imperial General Staff is Created
As the Secretary of State for War became more and. 
more deeply engrossed, in the military affairs of the British 
Empire, it became obvious to him that the dominions were 
destined to play a greater role in the defense of the 
Empire. ^  In order to incorporate dominion forces into the 
defense scheme, it was necessary to provide for uniform 
training methods, standard, organization, and professional 
military education for the officers. Haldane set Generals 
Nicholson and Haig to the task of working out proposals to 
achieve these aims.^9
In 1907, an Imperial Conference of Premiers was held 
in London. It was at this meeting that Haldane presented a 
resolution asking for military cooperation and requesting 
that priority should be given to the establishment of an 
Imperial General Staff. Haldane addressed the colonial 
delegates and pointed out the need for common organization, 
standardized training methods, and. explained, the benefits 
that could be derived, by all the member nations if an 
Imperial General Staff were instituted•^  He let it be known
[f O
Donald C. Gordon, The Dominion Partnership in 
Imperial Defense (Baltimore! The Johns Hopkins Press,
1965), p. 272. cf. Dunlop, pp. 293-296.
^Terraine, p. f^-3*
6o D.C. Gordon, pp. 272-273.
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that the functions of command and administration were to be
retained by the dominion government concerned* The General
Staff would function as an advisory agency at the request of
the respective government and would concern itself primarily
with planning, organization, and training of the Empire for- 
61ces. The conferees accepted and approved the proposals 
of the Secretary of State for War and requested that a 
memorandum be prepared for their consideration which outlined 
in detail the workings of an Imperial General Staff*
General Sir W.G* Nicholson, Chief of the British 
General Staff, immediately began to prepare this memorandum 
and submitted it on 17 December 1908* This document stressed 
uniformity and standardization of strategic concepts and 
training* General Nicholson went even further and established 
the requirement that all officers identified for service with 
the Imperial General Staff would have to be graduates of the 
Staff College* The Staff College at Camberley was designated 
as the primary military professional school of the Empire* *
Nicholson further proposed an interchange of officers 
and frequent communication between Chiefs of the Dominion
^ Ibid* cf* Teagarden, p* 126*
62Hittle, pp* 13ih-135; D*C* Gordon, p* 27^; Teagarden,
p* 127*
^Hittle, p. 133; D. C. Gordon, p. 273. The Prussian 
approach of developing the staff as a military intellectM is 
reflected in Nicholson1s proposals*
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Staffs and the Imperial General Staff in London.
This memorandum was presented by Haldane before the 
Imperial Defense Conference which met in London in July of 
1909- The Dominion representatives accepted. Haldane*s pro­
posals wholeheartedly and thus joined in a partnership for 
defense with the Mother Country. In November of 1909> the 
title of Chief of the General Staff was changed to the Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff and General Sir William 
Nicholson became the first incumbent of that office.^5
The establishment of the Imperial Staff won wide-spread 
approval. Repington, even though he was not entirely pleased 
with the work of the staff in the field, voiced his wholehearted 
approval.00 General Haig indicated that the creation of the 
Imperial General Staff H. • . puts 50fo onto the value of the
General Staff.u^7
In the remaining years proceeding World War I, the fruits 
of coordinated, staff planning on an Imperial scale were soon 
realized. The Imperial General Staff was a logical outgrowth 
from the British General Staff, but the laurels for its creation 
belong to Haldane and those who labored with him.
^Dunlop, p. 297*
•^5Ibid», p. 298. Haldane, An Au tobiography, pp. 213-21L.
J a y  Luvaas, The Education of an Army, British Military 
Thought, 1815-19^0 (London: Cassell, 1965), p. 312.
^Terrains, p. LU.
. CHAPTER V 
THE SECOND LINE
The Origins of the Second Line
One of the most difficult problems that confronted.
the Secretary of State for War in his mission of army reform
“was the revamping of the Auxiliary Forces. The responsibilities
of the Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers were not clearly
defined and they existed under a ,rhodgepodge 1 of legal and
political restrictions which made them a costly luxury.**" Ihese
semi-trained military establishments riddled with tradition,
prejudices, and. special interest groups did not fit the
2Haldane formula of economy and. efficiency.
It was in the smoke-filled library at Cloan in the
first months of the War Ministerfs term of office where the
idea for a Territorial Army was spawned, by the fertile minds
of Haldane and Ellison. They clearly foresaw the necessity
of an organized, defined force, a Second Line to back the
3
Expeditionary F o r c e /  a military force which could be expanded 
into a larger array if required.
^Maurice, Vol. I, pp. 20L-20.5; Lee, Vol. II, p. L9^ +; 
Grey, et al., Viscount Haldane, pp. 8-9*
^Haldane, An Autobiography, p. 199*
^Dunlop, p. 366; Teagarden, pp. lL8-1^9*
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The Volunteers had only limited equipment; the 
Militia did not fit any pattern of organization; and the 
Yeomanry was a tradition ridden, semi-trained, mounted corps 
officered by country gentlemen. It was Haldane*s aim to take 
these diverse forces, transgress the boundaries of tradition 
and. politics and mold them into a usable fighting force.**'
In January of 1906, Haldane dispatched his first
memorandum to the Army Council which outlined his basic
scheme for a Territorial Army built from the Militia,
Volunteers and Yeomanry.*'* This force was to be administered
by county associations similar to those which Cromwell had
used.^ Unlike his predecessors, Haldane proceeded slowly.
He formed, a committee in May of 1906 which Lord Esher chaired.
The Territorial Force; Committee was composed of forty-five
prominent Regular Army, Militia, and. Volunteer officers. The
purpose of "The Duma," as it was nicknamed, was to determine
if the Auxiliary Forces could, be established by agreement in
preference to legislation.^ Among the more prominent members
of this committee were Lord Roberts and Lord Methuen, both
Regular Army officers, Lord Lovat, the Duke of Bedford, and
Colonel J.E.B. Seely, who was destined to become Haldane1s 
8successor•
**Haldane, An Autobiography, pp. 205-206 .
-*Brett (ed. ), Vol. II, pp. 205-206.
^Dunlop, p. 266.
^Ibid., Maurice, Vol. I, p. 206. The "Duma" was a 
Russian attempt at a parliamentary body. • .
^Ibid., Dunlop, pp. 267-268.
9b
The committee did not reach a decision, nor did it 
publish a formal report. Their efforts, however, were not 
entirely wasted. They worked, out a detailed plan for 
utilizing the county associations to perform the adminis­
trative functions for a Territorial Force. They decided that 
the Territorial Army would be composed of Yeomanry, Volun­
teers and, Cadet Corps. The aloof Militia were, for the time 
being, excluded as they did not come to terms.9 It soon 
became evident to Haldane that he would not be able to
establish the Territorial Army by agreement; legislation
10would be necessary.
ICing Edward VII was a stout proponent of the Terri­
lltorial scheme. However, when Haldane neglected to inform 
the sovereign as to whom he had placed on this committee he 
received a stern rebuke. Haldane did not risk the King1s 
friendship and support in this matter again
It was no easy task to unravel the complex ties of 
political influence and tradition which bound the Auxiliary 
establishment; the roots were too deeply entwined with the 
history of Britain.
^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 167-169.
**^Dunlop, p. 269* 
ilLee, Vol. II, p. ^95- 
•^Ibid., p. 500*
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The Militia
The Militia, the "Old Constitutional Force," was 
formed for home defense in the sixteenth century. It fought 
with distinction during the French invasion of 1690 and later 
was called upon "• • • to deal with the Jacobite
rising. • • . In the early l800*s the Militia was granted
a semi-Regular status and in l8**8, was again revived as a 
Volunteer force. The "Constitutional Force" was not liable 
for service abroad, however, many of its officers and men 
volunteered for service during the Peninsular War and in 
Crimea. During the Boer War, the Militia furnished 
. . more than **5,000 officers and men. . . . "1^
The Militia1s role had continually been one of re- 
enforcement for the Regular contingents. Lord Lansdowne said 
of it, ". • . It was plundered at one end by the Line and 
encroached upon at the other by the Volunteers• By 1906,
this proud force numbered 98,000 men, approximately **0,000
•j zT
less than authorized. {
The Yeomanry
The Yeomanry traced its origin to'1761, but it was
■^Gordon, p. 86.
1^Ibid., p. 87.
■*^Grey, et al. , Viscount Haldane, p. 8, cf. Haldane, 
An Autobiography, p. 205•
^Gordon, p# 87*
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not utilized until the French Revolutionary W a r s . ^  They 
were a form of volunteer cavalry, largely drawn from rural
i ftand agricultural areas and officered, by the landed gentry.
The law provided that the Yeomanry could be called up in the 
event of "imminent national danger and great emergency.
As a result, the Imperial Yoomanry furnished over 27,000 men 
during the Boer War and were used, with success as mounted 
infantry•
The Volunteers
The Volunteers were of more recent vintage. In 1802, . 
when a Napoleonic invasion threatened, England responded with 
a Volunteer Force of **0,000 men, however, as danger lessened, 
this force rapidly deteriorated•^  In 1859* when danger 
again threatened England, patriots formed, all over the country. 
They drilled, and organized themselves; the expense was borne 
primarily by their commanding officers. This force continued 
in being and, over 20,000 men served in the South African War.^^
17e • K.G. Six smith, "Reserve and. Auxiliary Forces: Some
Former Controversies," Army■Quarterly, (April 1966), pp. 1-2. 
This article was furnished, by the author in proof form and 
was scheduled for publication in April 1966. Therefore, page 
references may not coincide with the actual publication copy.
*^Ibid. , W.H* Goodenough and J.C. Dalton, The Army 
Book for the British Empire (London: Her Majesty*s Stationery
Office, 1^937, pp. 37*4-376.
Six smith, p. 2.
Grey, et al., Viscount Haldane, p. 9*
23-Gordon, pp. 88-89*
^ I b i d ., cf. Goodenough and Dalton, pp. 379-381.
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The Volunteer Force, due to its nature, was composed mostly 
of infantry with a sprinkling of artillery and engineers and 
was confined to the battalion l e v e l . T h e  government pro­
vided. arms and ammunition and. a capitation grant of thirty- 
eight shillings per man. This was hardly sufficient and a 
large financial burden was placed on the commanding officers 
of these Volunteer units. The task of amalgamating these 
units, each with its own proud, history, would most likely have 
discouraged a lesser man than Haldane, who continued to ' 
tenaciously pursue his goal.
The Militia Stands Firm
Xt was clearly the Militia who presented the most dif­
ficult problem and a conference was called at the War Office 
to treat with the representatives of this stubborn and 
parochial f o r c e M a j o r - G e n e r a l  Mackinnon arranged the con­
ference with fourteen Militia Colonels, headed by the JDuke of 
Bedford and Lord Raglan. Lord Roberts, Lord Methuen, and 
General Mackinnon, as well as Generals Stopford, Haig and 
Colonel Ellison, represented the War Office, and the dependable 
Esher consented to chair the meeting. °
^Gordon, p. 89.
2^Sixsmith, p. 2.
2^Dunlop, pp. 269-270.
26Xbid.
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The War Office made the following proposals:
The Militia should not form part of the Territorial 
Army; that the Militia should be drawn closer to 
the Regular Troops; that it should be made liable 
to service abroad in case of emergency; and that in 
the event of its being sent abroad, it was desirable 
that it should go out, as far as possible, in com­
plete battalions or companies under their own of­
ficers, but that this should, not preclude its being 
utilized, to furnish drafts to the Regular Army in 
the field when necessary.2?
The War Office proposal was rejected by the Militia 
Colonels who countered with a proposal of their own. The 
Militia stipulated that its officers should rank equal with 
officers of the line battalions; that they should be granted 
an exemption from civil obligation; money for uniforms should 
be given the Militia; bounty payments should be modified; and, 
no one who had. previously served two terms in the Militia 
should be allowed, to compete for a Commission in the Regular 
Army. The Militia further demanded that it should be ac­
corded all honors of the line battalions to which they were 
attached. These demands were unacceptable to the War Office
p p
representatives.
The War Minister made one more attempt to reach an 
agreement with the Militia. He met informally with. Lord 
Derby and offered, a final choice. The Militia could, either 
take a leading place in the Territorial Army or ally them­
selves more closely with the Regular Forces. The Militia
2?Ibid., p. 270. cf• Sixsmith, p. 6.
2^Dunlop, p. 270; Sixsmith, p. 6; Teagarden, pp.
15^ 1— 155, citing Command Paper 3513? p* 3*
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chose to do neither, and their fate was sealed.2^
On the other hand, the Volunteer officers did not
relish turning over their commands to county associations 
and many of them looked upon their units with great pro­
prietary interest. It was Haldanefs viewpoint that the Vol­
unteers would make a much more efficient addition to the
Territorial Force if the commanding officers were not plagued
30with financial responsibilities which had been their lot. 
Viscount Esher strongly supported the War Minister in a letter 
to the King,s secretary. He wrote, "i agree with every wo£d. 
you say about the Volunteers. They are a gigantic fraud.
• • • I am strongly in favour of Haldane*s * County Associations1 
scheme. • • ."31
It was now October and. the pressure of influential 
Volunteer officers caused Haldane to waver on his commit­
ment to county associations. A staunch supporter of the 
county association idea, Lord. Esher prodded, the War Minister,
You have got to choose between a certain amount of 
opposition in the H^ousje7 of C ^ o m m o n a n d  a loss 
of personal prestige in~the Country. To my mind, 
the position is not doubtful. You can, with 
your large majority, risk the former. You can­
not risk the latter.32
^Dunlop, p. 272.
-^Teagarden, p. 157* citing Ellison, Lancashire Lad,
XVII (February 1936), p. 9.
^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, p. 185.
32Ibid.., p. 195.
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The decision made, Haldane enlisted the aid of an 
old friend, John Kemp, and some of his old "devils1* at 
Lincoln's Inn in drawing up the preliminary Territorial 
Force bill^3 and then asked Frederick Liddell to couch the 
bill in the proper Parliamentary format.
The opposition was by no means cowed* The controver­
sial General Wilson, who believed in armies of large Contin­
ental formations, belittled the Territorial Force* Lord 
Roberts added, his doubts and Arnold-Forster was free with his
r
vitriolic comments*35 Major General Haig rode to the support 
of the embattled War Minister and firmly defended the Terri­
torial plan* **I deprecate any change in the policy of creating 
a second line Army, complete in all arras and service
Committed to legislation, the War Minister, like a
careful artisan, began to lay his plan for Parliamentary
victory* Through Esher he enlisted the support of the King*
Esher observed to the King,
There is no doubt that very serious troubles lie in 
the immediate future for Mr* Haldane, owing to the 
opposition which his scheme will rouse in the 
Volunteers, and great strength of character will 
be required to push the scheme through the House 
of Commons where the Volunteers command large in­
terest *37
33Haldane, An Autobiography, p* 206* ."Devils" here 
refers to some of Haldane * s former lawyer assistants*•
3*Ibld.
33punlop, p. 2?5; Terrains, p* Jf2*
36Ibid.
37Brott (®d.), Vol. II, p. 205.
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On 20 December, Haldane presented bis plan to the 
cabinet and received, their support. Esher records, the Prime 
Minister11 • • • told. Haldane that he might count on his 
thorough support. The fact is that none of the cabinet 
understand, or ever -will understand, the question.,f*^
Realizing the importance of keeping the monarch in­
formed, on 12 January 1907i the War Minister sent the King a 
draft of his bill. The King pledged his full support.^9 
Leaving little to chance, Haldane arranged to meet with Balfour, 
the Opposition leader, on a weekend at Windsor Castle and 
requested his support. Balfour agreed, to give Haldane his 
chance.^ The problem now remained to squeeze the bill into 
the busy legislative calendar. One of the Liberal social 
reform bills had. run into difficulties and Haldane explained,
HI had a little Bill which, would just fill the time."^ 
Preparations made, the wiley War Minister was now ready to 
guide his bill through Parliament.
The Territorial and. Reserve Forces Act
The Secretary of State for War chose bis second esti­
mate speech which he delivered on 25 February 1907, as a
•^Xbid., p. 209* Viscount Esher, as well as Haldane, 
was surprised by Campbell-Bannerman1s support which may 
account for Esher*s facetious comment.
^Lee, Vol. IX, p. 500. King Edward was vitally 
interested in the passage of the Territorial Bill and gave 
the matter his personal attention.
IxQHaldane, An Autobiography, p. 207*
^Ibid.
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handy vehicle to outline his plan for the Territorial and
Reserve Forces''Bill*^ Haldane realized that he •would, need
the full support of the Liberal benches for his Army Bill.
Ke began his speech by unveiling a budget reduction of
£,2 ,036*000, an accomplishment for which he gave full credit
to the Army.^ He then fired, his opening volley at the
Militia. He pointed outs
We get 12,000 recruits a year for the infantry of the 
Line from the Militia at present, and without the 
Militia we could not get them. . . .  The result is 
that under the existing system the War Office must 
control the Militia. . . . and if the Militia p r o - ^
tests against it, . . .  the Militia must go under.
The Yeomanry did not present major problems and only 
a minor effort would be required to establish them as the 
cavalry of the Territorial Army.^
The third element of the Territorial Army would be fash­
ioned from the Volunteers. Haldane portrayed the sadly lacking 
financial structure of this force, -'if they ^the Volunteerjs/ 
were at war, the Colonel, whose business it is to provide 
socks, clothes, ammunition, and. everything else, would have
J,/T
to carry these things with him in his saddle-bags." Haldane 
proposed, a standard financial arrangement for the Territorial 
Army which would allow the Volunteer commanders to spend their
■^Dunlop, p. 277; Maurice, Vol. X, p. 209*
^Sommer, p. 191* Haldane, Army Reform, pp. 9^-99*
This speech may also be found in ParTI Debs., 4, CLXIX (1907’)*
pp. 1290-1326.
^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 108.
^ Xbid. , p. 110.
^6Ibid., p. 111.
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time training their units instead of worrying about financing 
them.
The Territorial Army was to be organized in fourteen 
divisions supported by fourteen mounted brigades, complete 
with their own supply and support organizations, as well as 
artillery and. engineers. The force would be organized on a 
county basis and the administration would be vested, in the 
Lord Lieutenants of the county.^ The primary purpose of the 
Territorial Army would, be home service and the men would 
undergo an intensive six month training course. There was,
hn
however, no restriction on Territorial Force service abroad. ^
Haldane concluded his address by detailing the ad­
vantage of the Territorial Force. Primarily the British nation 
would, now have both a first and second line available for 
mobilization. The second, line would be expandable in the 
event of war. In this manner, an efficient force would be 
provided, at home to lorotect the country from the danger of 
invasion or raids.
The War Minister then informed the members of the 
House that a copy of his bill would be available on the 
following Monday and to provide sufficient time for study the 
bill would not be placed, on the legislative calendar until
J, o
Maurice, Vol. I, p. 209; Haldane, Army Reform, 
pp. 115-119*
^Dunlop, p. 278, Pari. Debs..,fr, . CLXIX (1907)*
pp. 1300-1306.
■^Haldane, Army Reform, p. 150.
after Easter.*^
The same day Mr. Haldane Issued his Memorandum upon 
the Military Forces in the United, Kingdom. I n  this docu­
ment Haldane explained his plan in detail and enumerated, the 
weaknesses of the Auxiliary Forces as they presently existed. 
Debato oontinuod in the House of Commons for three days.
The powers, duties and tasks of the county associations were
fully discussed as were the roles of the Territorial Force
53and the special reserve,'
The bill was introduced on 4 March 1907, and the
5bsecond reading was taken on April 9* 10 » and 23* Through­
out the fight, Haldane*s optimism never faltered, even though
there were others who thought that the opposition of the
• 55Yeomanry and. Volunteers would threaten the bill's passage.
The debate continued and the speakers rambled on. The 
opposition was not able to mount a concerted attack; they were 
satisfied with attacking first one point and then another.
The influence of Militia, Volunteers and Yeomanry, each 
battling for their own parochial interest, was soon dissipated.
The bill had its third reading on June 19• Arnold- 
Forster rose to attack the Territorial scheme. In his
^1Ibid., pp. 153-15**.
Dunlop, p. 2799 citing Command. Paper 3297 of 190 7* 
^ Ibid., p. 280.
^ I b i d ., p. 281; Maurice, Vol. I, p. 211.
^Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 227-228.
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harangue he constantly referred back to his own dead plan 
for a short term Army. The War Minister quickly disposed of 
Arnold-Forster1s pathetic arguments. He quipped, **I own that 
X -was under the impression that X found, a deceased, baby, and 
X decently interred it.**-^ The bill* passed, by a majority 
of 286 to 63*^
The Earl of Portsmouth, Under-Secretary of State for 
War, guided Haldane*s bill on its journey through the House 
of Lords.5$ The question of the Militia -was uppermost in the 
minds of the Lords. The Earl of Verayss accurately summed up 
the problem, **Your Lordships are no doubt aware that • • •
the Militia has been taken out of the Territorial Force, and 
is no longer grouped with the Volunteers and Yeomanry. . . .
The Militia is now to be a reserve for the Army.M^^
! Xn order to placate the opposition in the Lords, Haldane, 
with Esher*s help, compromised, on a few minor points of his
60
plan and in the middle of July the bill was finally accepted.
1 61The King s formal consent was received on 2 August.
•-^Dunlop, p. 283*
^Tparl. Debs., b, CLXXVI (1907), pp. 578-579.
^Maurice, Vol. X, p. 212.
^Dunlop, p # 28b; Sommer, p. 19**.
6oBrett (ed. ), Vol. XI, p. 239.
6lLee, Vol. II, p. 501; Dunlop, p. 285.
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The bill was a concise document, divided into four
parts* Part I dealt with the county associations, their
powers and duties, financial arrangements and regulations.
Part II delineated, the rules and regulations which would, govern
the Territorial Force, and covered, such items as recruitment,
discipline, pay, enlistment terms, training, civil rights,
and, terms of service. Part III concerned the Reserve Force,
liabilities of service, enlistment and also dealt with transfer
of Militia battalions to reserve units. Part IV constituted
62a short miscellaneous section.
The passage of the Territorial Army bill caused con­
siderable stir since its provisions affected not only mem­
bers of the military establishment, but reached out to every 
corner of civilian enterprise where officers of the Auxiliary 
elements were engaged.
H.O. Arnold-Forster continued to indiscriminately 
attack every part of the b i l l . ^  Spenser Wilkinson depre­
cated, the War Ministerfs accomplishments and wrote that all 
Haldane 11. . . had. done was to rechristen the Volunteers.
In an article published by the Contemporary Review, F.N. Maude
^Great Britain, Statutes at Large, 7 Edw. VII, Ch. 9 
(190 7)9 "Territorial and, Reserve Forces Act, 1907*" PP* 1-26.
^ T h e  Times (London), March 5 , 1907. Mr. Arnold- 
Forster carried out his attack in a series of articles 
published, in The Times on March 5* 8 , 10 and 16.
^ W i  lkinson, Thirty-Five Years, p. 308.
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criticized the financial arrangements of the new Territorial 
Army. -^5 The Quarterly Review, on the other hand,, felt that 
the training provisions were insufficient to fit the Terri­
torial Army for service in the event of an emergency.^ Other 
journals of the day decried the untimely demise of the proud, 
Mili tia.
The Territorial Army also had an equal number of 
staunch supporters. The influential Colonel Repington was 
generous with Jiis praise for the War Minister. "Mr. Haldane 
and his military advisors have done their duty by the country 
and have done it well, considering the notorious limitations 
which restrict their initiative. Most surprising was the
tribute of the Prime Minister, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman; 
he wrote to his War Minister, "it is a great triumph to have 
carried, such a large body of opinion with you, and X hope you 
will have as much satisfaction when you proceed to carry out
, / ' O
and superintend the details of your magnum opus."
The Territorial Army Becomes a Reality
The task was, however, only half finished. It now
^F.N. Maude, "The New Army Scheme," The Contemporary
Review, XCI (January-June 1907), P* 519*
rt r
"Mr. Haldane and, The Army," Quarterly Review 
(January-April 1907), p. ^73.
^Charles a Court Repington, The Foundations of 
Reform (London: Simpkin, Marshall and, Co., 1908), p. 32^.
^Haldane, An Autobiography, p. 195*
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remained to man the Second Line by voluntary enlistment* 
Haldane traversed the country lecturing, explaining and 
cajoling in an effort to win the support of county author­
ities and Volunteer commanding officers. The King supported 
Haldane to the full extent of his royal power and did. what 
no other man in England could have done for the Territorial 
Army. On 26 October he called a meeting of the Lord Lieu­
tenants of England, Wales and. Scotland and enjoined them to
6qgive their full support to the Territorial Army. ^
My Lords and. Gentlemen, I have summoned you . . .  to 
acquaint you with the new duties and responsibilities 
which will now devolve upon you. . . .  Henceforth my 
Yeomanry and my Volunteers are to form the Territorial 
Army, over the destinies which you and your County 
Associations are to watch; so to you are now delegated 
the duties of raising, equipping and maintaining that 
portion of this force the Imperial Army of the Second 
Line which lies within the shores of this Kingdom.
The command and training of this force will be en- 
. trusted to the Generals in the commands and to the 
■ generals and other officers serving them, so that 
the force may enjoy in the fullest degree, in com­
mon with the Regular Army, those advantages which 
accrue from being instructed in the highest and most 
developed school of military thought. . . .  In the 
performance of this difficult task I have instructed 
the military authorities to render all the help that 
is in their power to give; but the ultimate success 
must depend upon the goodwill and public spirit of 
my loyal subjects, inspired and guided by you and 
your County Associations. • • • My Lords and Gentle­
men, The important duties and responsibilities which 
were formerly yours, are being restored, to you and 
when you return hence to undertake this great and 
honourable task, I look to you to foster and direct, 
by your precept and example, the spirit of patriotic 
and voluntary effort which has for so long distin­
guished my loyal subjects. . . .  I have faith that 
the united efforts of my people will enable you to 
achieve success.'
69Lee, Vol. II, p. .501. 
^Maurice, Vol. I, pp. 213-214
Thus spoke the King of England*
The JDuke of Norfolk, on behalf of the Lord Lieu­
tenants, assured his sovereign that they would perforin their 
new duties*?^ Mr* Haldane was deeply grateful and expressed 
his profuse thanks to the King* Xn order to provide for a
period of conversion, Haldane fixed the birth date of the
72Territorial Army as 1 April 1908* The War Minister con­
tinued to work tirelessly to stimulate enlistments in the 
Territorial Army* He traveled to all corners of England and
was never too busy to meet or visit with a new unit* Slowly
73the force grew.fy
Lord Esher persuaded The Daily Mail (London) to con­
duct a recruiting campaign on behalf of HThe Terriers.11 The
newspaper proved to be an appreciated ally in its efforts to
74entice recruits for the Territorial Army* By 1 June 1909# 
the Territorial Force numbered 9#313 officers and 259,463 
m e n . ^  Recruiting efforts continued and by 1910 the Terri­
torial Army was manned to 88*5 per cent of its authorized 
strength* ^
71Lee, Vol. XI, p. 501.
72Ibid. Maurice, Vol. I, p. 214.
^Dunlop, p* 286.
^**Brett (ed*), Vol. IX, p. 3^9* “Terriers11 was a 
popular nickname for the Territorial Army* Haldane paid 
special tribute to The Daily Mail for its aid in recruiting*
^Dunlop, p. 287*
76jbid.
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The King also used, his great influence to increase 
enlistments. During the months of June and July 1909, the 
sovereign presented 130 battalions with their colors, and 
in June he reviewed 108 Territorial Regiments and presented 
colors to them at Windsor.77
Haldane*s vision of a Volunteer Army, a Second Line, 
had. become reality. The creation of this force which was 
designed to provide the backing for the Expeditionary Force 
stands as a monument and. marked a major milestone of the 
Haldane reforms.
Referring to the Second Line, Mr. Repington wrote,
"• • • The Minister deserves the gratitude of the country 
for the patience, assiduity, and foresight which he has 
displayed in promoting a national work.11^  The value of this 
great accomplishment can best be measured by the tributes which 
were paid, the Territorial Army on the occasion of its twenty- 
first anniversary. Lord Ypres remarked, " • • • Without the 
assistance which the Territorials afforded • • . i t  would have 
been impossible to have held the lines in France and Bel­
gium. • • ,"79 was tfte King himself who added, "There
was no theatre of war to which they did not penetrate; there 
was none in which they did not do credit to the British name.1'^
77Lee, Vol. II, pp. 308-509.
^Repington, Foundations of Reform, p. 392.
P^Ihe Times (London), April 1, 1929* Lord Ypres 
formerly General Sir John French.
CHAPTER VI 
IN RETROSPECT
The "Warrior 1s"Lot
The energy of Richard Burdon Haldane was like a 
bubbling fountain. In the remarkably short period of two 
and a half years he completely revitalized and reorganized, 
the British Army system. A trained Expeditionary Force was 
a reality, the British General Staff was a functioning or­
ganization and the Territorial Force was rapidly becoming 
an effective combat reserve organization. It was, however, 
not yet the "warrior1s"lot to sheathe his sword for the task
was not yet complete.
f
Lord. Roberts and his National Service League believed 
that the British Army should be a large force built on the
I
Continental model and advocated, national conscription.
Lord Roberts also had, the support of General Wilson,
Commandant of the Staff College, who was primarily concerned
about the lack of provision for expansion of the Army in war 
2time. General Kitchener also lent his name to the cause of 
the opposition. He was typical of a small group of generals
•^Maurice, Vol. I, p. 221.
2Callwell, Vol. I, p. 76.
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who believed that politicians were, by nature, incapable of 
reforming the Army.^
On 12 March 1908, Roberts attacked Haldane*s scheme 
in the House of Lords* His target was the addition of 
partially-trained artillery batteries to the Territorial 
Force. Artillery, Roberts contended,, must be fully trained, 
and the Territorial batteries would, be useless even danger-
Ll
ous in their semi-trained state *
At this point even the King temporarily wavered in
his support of the War Minister and conveyed his doubts to
Haldane through a letter from Sir Arthur Davison who wrote 1
The King gathered from the views of Lord Roberts 
and others that the training of the Territorial 
artillery was inadequate, and drew your attention
to their argument that if these gunners were im­
perfectly trained their value disappeared.5
Haldane, however, was able to allay his sovereign*s fears and
I
the dependable Esher rallied to the Xtfar Minister*s cause in 
a letter to the King on 8 April 1908, which closed with this
ringing indorsement, 11. • • Mr* Haldane has done more for the
Regular Army than any minister since Cardwell, and that your 
Majesty will be unfortunate when he ceases to be your Majes­
ty* s Secretary of State*11^
In June 1908, the army estimates encountered fierce
1
^Philip Magnus, Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist.
(New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1959)$ P« 228*
^Lee, Vol. II, p. 503? Maurice, Vol I, pp. 221-222; 
Dunlop^ p. 275. '
W e e ,  Vol. II, p. 503*
6Brett (ed.), Vol. II, pp. 302-303*
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opposition in the Cabinet. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, and Winston Churchill, President of the Board of 
Trade, supported by Fisher, The First Sea Lord, advocated 
drastic reductions in the army estimates. Ihe pressure 
became so intense that Haldane considered resignation. How­
ever, Edward VIX was so impressed with his War Minister*s 
fight that he enjoined him to stand firm. Haldane won the 
battle of the estimates and fully regained the confidence of 
the King. Haldane also had. the support of Asquith, the Prime 
Minister, and. Grey.?
The fight against conscription and the National Ser­
vice League occupied much of the War Minister's time during 
the years 1908 to 1910. The powerful advocates of conscription
i
were firmly entrenched in the House of Commons and in the House 
of Lords. They were a "thorn in Haldane's side,1 particularly
8while he was battling the retrenchers over the 1908 estimates.
The conscriptionists, meanwhile, moved to a liter­
ary battlefield. In 1909* Spenser Wilkinson wrote Britain at 
Bay which painted a dark future unless conscription became the 
"order of the day."^ Arnold-Forster apparently could not 
resist the challenge to reply. In his book Military Needs 
and Military Policy he resurrected the short service army
^Sommer, pp. 21L-217, cf. Philip Magnus, King Edward, 
the Seventh (New York* E.P. Dutton and. Company, Inc., 1964), 
pp. 386-387.
^Maurice, Yol. I., pp. 263-266.
^Spenser Wilkinson, Britain at Bay (London: Constable
and Co., Ltd., 1910), Passim.
I'll*
scheme he had advocated earlier.10 Haldane entered, the fray 
and asked his Adjutant-General, Sir Ian Hamilton, to present 
the arguments against conscription. Haldane personally con­
tributed a forty-two page "introduction" to Hamilton1s book 
Compulsory Service: A Study of the Question in the Light of
Experience.11
The National Service League refuted. Hamiltonfs book 
with a pamphlet by its own champion, Lord Roberts, entitled 
Fallacies and Facts: An Answer to "Compulsory Service.
This book was the last of the "literary lances." lhere were 
several attempts to push a compulsory service bill through 
Parliament. In each case, however, the bill ran into strong 
opposition and was withdrawn.1^
Haldane continued to build the Territorial Force and 
in 1908, accomplished, yet another reform. He published the 
Army Order of 1 March 1908, which initiated an Officers* 
Training Corps. This program was designed to produce reserve
10Arnold,-Forster, Military Needs, passim.
U l a n  Hamilton, Compulsory Service: A Study of
the Question in the Light of Experience. (London: John
Murray,' I9I1 ), pp. 1-42. Haldane's conduct here was 
questionable,and he was criticized for involving an 
active duty officer in a political conflict.
12Earl Roberts, Fallacies and Facts, An answer to 
"Compulsory Service." (London: JohnMurray, 1911).
13farl. Debs., 4, CLXXXXI (1908), p. i486.
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officers with minimum interference to their civil careers
and formed officer training corps in conjunction with public
lLschool and the university.
The medical corps was improved and a nursing service 
was added to the Territorial Force. Throughout the remain­
ing years of his career as War Minister, Haldane continued to 
labor on behalf of the Royal Army.
The Later Years
He was raised to the peerage in 1911» and, in 1912, 
when Lord Loreburn resigned the Lord Chancellorship, Asquith 
offered the post to Haldane. Haldane thanked the Prime 
Minister in the following words, "More than six years ago you
fought a hard, fight for your old friend over this great
\
office and now you have yourself bestowed it on him. My feel­
ing X will not try to express. You know how deep it is. "1.5 
In the years that followed, the ring of the German 
jackboot became louder and louder and the British nation 
girded, for war. Old hatreds were revived and., as in time of 
war and. national crisis, reason fled, the minds of men and 
tempers flared. Haldane's enemies wasted little time in 
branding him a Germanophile. It was said that in earlier 
years Haldane had. made statements that his spiritual home was
l^Dunlop, pp. 29*4— 295.
^Sommer, p. 269* Haldane's term as Lord Chancellor 
is lucidly described in Haldane* An Autobiography, pp. 266-308.
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in Germany. In truth, this alluded, only to his love of 
philosophy and. the roots of that discipline which are firmly 
anchored in Germany.^ No man was a greater patriot and had 
more love of England than Haldane. Ironically, it was Lord 
Haldane who was summoned, in the first days of the war to 
put into action the plan which he had so faithfully designed. 
Acting for the Prime Minister, Haldane returned to the War 
Office and on 3 August 191** directed the immediate mobiliza­
tion of the Expeditionary Force,, the Territorial Force and 
other reserve elements.1?
After the end of the war in 1918, peace and tranquility 
returned, once again to England. Only then did Viscount Haldane 
begin to receive some of the credit that was his due. Yet, 
one cannot help but consider the humiliating lies and. charges 
which had been heaped upon this man who had devoted all of his 
adult life to the law and.the service of England.
•^Xbid., p. 302; Sommer, pp. 318-319*
1?Hald.ane, An Autobiography, pp. 29^-300. It should 
be clarified that Haldane was not at this time Secretary of
State for War. He acted temporarily for Asquith, the Prime 
Minister, who had also assumed the War Minister's duties 
following Sir John Seely's involvement in the "Curragh 
Mutiny.11
CHAPTER VXI 
CONCLUSION
The Spirit of Haldane
Hie accomplishments of Viscount Haldane met the tests 
of time and war. The Expeditionary Force which was on British 
soil in a matter of days after war was declared fought with 
glory at Mons and Ypres. The official British historian 
lauded, the ft01d Contemptibles11 as f,The line that stood be- 
tween the British Empire and ruin." The Imperial General
Staff has lead the British armed forces with honor and
\
efficiency through two world, wars and has only recently
!
i
reverted, to become once again the British General Staff. The
t
Territorials, which in two wars were the nucleus around which
a great citizen army was formed, have lived until the present
day and only now are undergoing a complete revision to mold.
19them to modern British defense requirements. ^
General Douglas Haig, when he returned, from the 
shores of France at the end. of World, War I, visited Haldane 
and presented, him with a copy of his war dispatches inscribed, 
ftTo Viscount Haldane of Cloan —  the greatest Secretary for
^Terrains, p. 112.
"^Letter from General Sir James Cassels, Chief of 
Defence Staff to the author, February 25, 1966.
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War England has ever had.H^  Haldane was no wild-eyed reform­
er, no expert on armies nor did he enter office with ready­
made plans and pre-packaged reforms* Had Haldane attempted 
to build a large Continental Army, it is likely that he too 
would have failed* Yet, Haldane was a scholar, an astute 
politician, who shrewdly measured the temper of the times 
and realized that the tax-burdened public and his own 
economy-minded party would not support a scheme for a gigantic 
army* He therefore wisely mated efficiency and economy and 
placed into the hands of Britain an army which was an effective 
instrument of war*
There were many who labored with Haldane to bring 
about these great changes in the British Army* The influen­
tial Lord Esher, Generals Haig, Nicholson, Ewart, Grierson, 
the redoubtable Colonel Ellison, the list is a long one* Yet 
ultimately, the responsibility, the success and the failures 
must rest on Haldane*s shoulders alone* Sixty years have 
passed, yet the foundation remains* General Cassells, the 
present Chief of the General Staff, states,
Despite the fact that we have now felt it necessary 
to discard the framework for the Reserves which he 
2jtaldaneyrestablished, and which served the British 
Nation so well in two World Wars, it is remarkable 
tribute to his foresight and clear thinking that 
few really significant changes to this Reserve 
framework have been found necessary until now*2-L
20Haldane, An Autobiography, pp* 307-3Q8; Charteris,
P. 37.
2^-Letter, Cassells to the author, February 25, 19^6«
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Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck credits Haldane "with 
creating 11 • • . A n  army fit to fight in the great war of 
191^-1918*1,22 Field Marshal Alexander refers to the Haldane 
reforms as "the basis of our armed forces."2^
The British Army has changed, with the needs of the 
times* yet even now after sixty years have passed, "The 
Spirit of Haldane L i v e s . B u t  the greatest tribute of all 
is the accolade bestowed by the man in the street who even 
now, more than half a century later, when he wishes to pay 
a compliment to a present Minister of War calls him, "The best 
since Haldane."2-*
22Letter from Field-Marshal, Sir Claude Auchinleck to 
the author, March 12, 1966.
2^Letter from Field-Marshal, the Right Honorable Earl
(Harold G.) Alexander to the author, February 23* 1966.
^Letter from Brigadier, Sir John K. Dunlop, Military
Author and historian to the author, May 31* 1966.
2^Letter from Major General, E.K.G. Sixsmith, Mili­
tary Author to the author, March 29, 19&6.
APPENDIX A
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE REGULAR ARMY WHICH 
ESTABLISHED THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE*
ALDERSHOT COMMAND
1st Cavalry Brigade
1st Division
1st Brigade - Aldershot 
2nd Brigade - Blackdovjn 
3rd. Brigade - Bordon
Three Field Artillery Brigades of three batteries each 
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade 
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
Two Royal Engineer Divisional Telegraph Companies
2nd. Division
Lth (Guards) Brigade - London
5th Brigade - Aldershot
6th Brigade - Aldershot
Three Field Artillery Brigades
Two Royal Engineers Field Companies
Army Troops
1st and 2nd Royal Engineer Air Line Companies 
1st and 2nd Royal Engineer Cable Telegraph Companies 
x 1st and 2nd Wireless Telegraphy Companies
1st and 2nd Royal Engineer Balloon Companies 
1st and 3rd Bridging Train
EASTERN COMMAND
2nd Cavalry Brigade - Canterbury 
Lth Cavalry Brigade - Colchester
*John K# Dunlopf The Development of the British
Army, 1899-191** (London s Methuen $ 193$)% P P • 262-264*
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4th Division
10th Brigade - Sborncliffe
11th Brigade - Colchester
12th Brigade - Chatham
Three Field Artillery Brigades
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
IRISH COMMAND
3rd Cavalry Brigade - Curragh
5th Division
13th Brigade - Dublin
14th Brigade - Curragh
15th Brigade - Belfast
Three Field Artillery Brigades
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
6th Division
l6th Brigade - Fermoy 
17th Brigade - Tipperary
18th Brigade (In Northern Command with Battalion at York, 
Lichfield (two) and Sheffield)
Three Field Artillery Brigades 
One Royal Engineer Field Company
SOUTHERN COMMAND
1st Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy Brigade 
2nd. Royal Garrison Artillery Heavy Brigade
3rd Division
7th Brigade — Tidworth
8th Brigade - Devonport
9th Brigade - Portsmouth
Three Field. Artillery Brigades
One Field Artillery (Howitzer) Brigade
Two Royal Engineer Field Companies
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